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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the relationship of political instability and economic failure to
predatory organized crime in multiple nations. This is an important issue since each year the
increase in predatory crime networks contributes to international economic failure, security risks,
and the spread of organized crime. In an effort to understand the relationship between state
failure and economic failure on the one hand, and organized crime on the other, this study will
seek to address three goals. First, the study tests the degree to which variables that imply
economic failure and state failure correlate with predatory organized crime. Second, the study
determines the extent of the relationship between the social and economic indicators and
predatory organized crime in multiple nations. Third, the study examines the future implications
of predatory organized crime predictor variables in the context of national strategies to eradicate
or reduce organized crime.
This study investigates the relationship in failed states between predatory crime groups
and various economic and state stability indicators. In particular, this study examines the impact
of seven predictor variables on the variation in Predatory Organized Crime in 122 countries. The
findings suggest that the state failure hypothesis correctly articulates the failure of the state to
offer key social goods such as security, stability, and justice, thereby producing an environment
where crime groups assume state responsibilities. The findings also support the economic failure
hypothesis that poor economic outcomes such as high unemployment, low SES, and a
dependency on an underground economy encourage the development of criminal groups.
The ultimate goal of this study is to assist policy makers, policy analysts, scholars, and
officials at donor agencies and international financial institutions in establishing effective tools
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for identifying and removing predatory organized crime units. Analytical results provide general
support to all hypotheses. Moreover, policy implications for predatory organized crime control in
developing countries are discussed. The author’s objective is to increase understanding of this
issue and show the need for further research.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The conclusion to the Cold War has engendered the rise of global civil society. The end
of the war has brought about the redistribution of power among states, markets, and civilization.
Countries lost autonomy in both a globalizing economy and political environment. It is in this
time period the conceptual paradigm of globalization increased its influences on economic and
political forces across the world. Nation-states were sharing powers (including political, social,
and security roles at the core of national sovereignty) with businesses, with international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations and predatory organized crime networks. The
steady concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of
Westphalia was replaced with a fluid network of transnational governance infrastructure.
Westphalia required that states become the primary institutional agents in an interstate
system of relations. The “Westphalian” doctrine supports three principles of nationalism. The
first principle agreed to the sovereignty of states and the fundamental right of political self
determination. The second principle agreed to states equality. The third principle spoke to nonintervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state. The dwindling of this
westphalian doctrine introduced a new paradigm of powerful states and corporations seeking to
influence the affairs of others, allowing forcible intervention by one country in the domestic
affairs of a weaker nation. Violation of the second principle that protects international equality
produced strong and weak nations. It is in this interaction where the foundation of globalization
theories explained and produced the ideas of internationalism as seen today. The isolationist
concepts of the westphalian doctrine gave way to an international network of transnational
actors. Globalization theories, in general, provide the DNA framework for transnational
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exchanges between large corporations and failed nation-states. Predatory crime groups use this
same theoretical skeleton to create thriving international businesses in poor countries. Global
interaction offered a greater system for the purposes of manipulating influence over the
economic and political platforms of weak nation-states for predatory crime groups.
Previous studies of predatory organized crime have focused on the sensitive relationship
between economic failure and political stability on the one hand, and predatory organized crime
on the other. Predatory organized crime networks have long survived by preying on the weak,
such as failed nation-states, that suffer from poor economic and political development.

Given

the conditions that beset failed nation-states and make them havens for predatory organized
crime groups, this initial chapter of the dissertation proposes a new agenda for the study of
predatory crime. This chapter will consider the information of historical relevance to failed
nation-states, the impact of globalization on criminal organizational characteristics, and identify
the emerging transnational economic and political conditions which give birth to new predatory
crime units.
Later in chapter one, building upon previous scholars’ analyses of predatory organized
crime and considering the aforementioned trends in the spatial distribution of failed nation-states,
I will analyze trends in both the economic failure of failed nation-states and the political stability
of failed nation-states within the expansive Failed States Index during 2008-2009. Additionally,
chapter one seeks to ascertain whether or not trends in the patterns of 133 failed nation-states
were accompanied by parallel trends in the organizational behavior of predatory crime networks.
In doing so, this chapter (1) investigates the theoretical impact of globalization on the growth and
expansion of predatory organized crime, (2) examines the specific factors responsible for
economic failure and political instability within a state, and (3) assesses the extent to which
2

predatory organized crime is both explained by, and explains, the phenomena of economic
failure and political instability.
Based upon research conducted by Hung-En Sung (2004) on predatory crime, the
following chapter interrogates the meaning of the term “predatory organized crime,” which has
been defined according to both network governance and globalization theories. Predatory
organized crime is identified according to its activities that illegally reduce competition in the
market, corrupt government officials, and undermine the efficient performance of the economy
(Sun, 1999). Failing countries experience the overwhelming presence of predatory crime
groups. According to the Failed State Index (2009), nation-states on the western regions of the
African continent top the list in terms of volume.
Transnational crimes in West Africa have been in existence since the 1960’s. Originally
predatory crime groups were manifested in the form of individuals or groups of traders and
business men and women smuggling goods across the borders, as well as cross-border syndicates
who engage in the trafficking of drugs, small arms and human beings as a means of profit growth
(UNODC, 2005). West African criminal networks are characterized by their flexibility and
ability to take on various forms and modes of operation. The criminal enterprises in West Africa
use similar techniques to that of legitimate traders and business people, typical of western
influenced societies. The standard procedure entails an aggressive individual entrepreneur
inviting junior partners to join in an illegal business venture. These activities eventually
assumed alarming proportions when human trafficking, for purposes of domestic slavery and
illegal sexual activities, accompanied such activities as the transporting of narcotics and the
smuggling of imports among other things. The outbreak of intra-state conflicts in West Africa,
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beginning with Libya in 1989, added mercenaries, small arms trafficking and recruitment of
child soldiers and fighters to the transnational crimes.
Network governance theory refers to the organizational behavior of predatory crime. The
flexible, informal, and relational collaboration of members of the criminal underworld enables
organized crime groups to discourage market competition through deliberate and strategic
contracting. This strategic contracting does not merely seek out friendly competition; it also
seeks to eliminate and monopolize local and international markets. The theory of network
governance, accounts for the partnership between criminal leaders and corrupt government
officials, who work together in efforts to reach the highest earning potential for both parties. A
second set of theories, globalization theories, explain the interdependence of countries due to
advanced technologies for communication and transportation. Predatory organized crime groups
have taken full advantage of the benefits of globalization and have utilized the tools to produce
efficient, effective, and resilient legal/illegal companies. This study uses both network
governance and globalization theories to identify the key elements that predatory organized
crime groups need in order to start, grow and expand.
This dissertation addresses the relationship in multiple nations between states’ political
instability and economic failure on the one hand, and predatory organized crime on the other.
This is an important issue since each year the increase in predatory crime networks contributes to
international security risks and perpetuates global poverty. The present introductory chapter
describes the organized crime problem, as well as this study’s research objectives and
hypothesis; it also outlines the rest of the dissertation.
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Policy Problem and Study Overview
Predatory crime remains a topic rarely discussed in research articles and journals.
However, the growth of this particular form of organized crime has exceeded the rate of growth
for traditional illegal group activities. This growth may be credited to global networks of
communication, global transformation of government structures, and global patterns of
populations (Sung, 2004). Globalization has catalyzed a re-structuring of systems around the
world. This evolution is evident in the way that an event in one part of the world becomes
interconnected with events far away, and can impact both international powers and failing
nation-states. Thus, isolationist policies cannot be an effective solution in combating
transnational predatory crime units. The economies, cultures, and conflicts of the world have
been merged into a single conglomeration.
The global financial crisis of 2008 has shown how interconnected national economies and
stable political structures actually are. It began when the housing balloon burst in the U.S.,
plunging the entire global community into a recession (Homes, Jones, & Marsden; 2009).
Additional evidence of an interwoven global community can be seen in the hike in food
commodity prices in 2007 which was partly due to financial assumptions in wealthy countries,
energy policy in the U.S., famine in Australia, and a long-term disregard of investments in
agriculture and food security (World Bank, 2006). Furthermore, 100 million people were
plunged into hunger by the resulting hike in fuel, food, and war costs (Grebmer, Nestorova et al.;
2009). The political and economic complications that reverberate within failed nation-states are
interconnected with, and have effects on, more developed countries. Therefore, predatory crime
groups can conduct administrative duties in failing nations while also satisfying consumers in
more developed regions around the world.
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The world has and continues to witness the disturbance in the living conditions of the
most vulnerable populations within various social economic structures. Women and children
are trafficked by predatory crime groups as virtual sex slaves for an international market, with
consumers ranging from the poor to the rich. Immigrants all around the world labor in some of
the most dangerous working conditions under the leadership of crime lords. Refugees die on the
journey to escape near death living spaces created by the criminal networks to maximize
productivity and reduce cost. Roughly 1.3 billion people live on less than one dollar a day
(World Bank, 2006). Global capitalism becomes the engine of an assembly line in which
government, corporate, and criminal networks collaborate in eroding the planet. Globalization
has so disrupted communities around the world that people’s desperation has left them open to
various forms of abuse. “Population desperation” is exploited by predatory crime groups who
wish to spread their economic and social influence across destitute populations in failed nationstates. However, the struggles of destitute populations have consequences that ripple throughout
the entire global community.
There is a rising recognition amongst international policy makers that the prosperity of
wealthy nations is entangled with the economic and political depression of poor countries
(Lancet, 2008). The impact of crime, social revolutions, and the economy of developing
countries reaches the borders of rich nations. Global economic and political tectonic plates are
shifting, creating new global threats that would have been impossible to fathom in a pre-digital
age.
The global economy has evolved more quickly than expected, leaving a short learning
curve on how to manage change effectively. Governments, corporations, and even criminal
networks are seeing their hierarchal business models become outdated in favor of a more fluid
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and flat organizational structure. Globalization has helped many countries to develop rapidly,
but it has also exposed more nations to systemic risks that arise because of their lack of
management ability. For any institution, building an organizational structure to manage the
fluid, global political and economic landscape is critical. Leading legal and illegal institutions
find it useful to shift to a network governance paradigm as a more adaptive model for managing
change. Network governance is a concept that helps explain the necessity of flexible
organizational structures in a global, fast-changing world.
This fast-paced global evolution benefits the predatory organized crime world just as
much as it does traditional governments. The constant fluctuation in the political and economic
landscape creates opportunities for predatory organized crime groups. The predatory criminal
enterprises that operate on one side of the world impact the social, cultural, and economic
environment on the other side of the world. Although globalization is a critical influence in the
expansionist behavior of predatory organized crime groups, this criminogenic network is
primarily concentrated in failed nation-states. Nonetheless, traces of organized crime groups can
be located in developed nations as well as in failed countries. Scholars suggest that organized
crime originated in developed nations due to the profit opportunities within a healthy economy
(Sung, 2004). The market for underground crime groups resides predominantly in wealthy
countries, which have citizens who can afford to purchase illegal products. Wealthy nations
acquire the outputs of an international chain of criminal organizational structures. The
production, transportation, and storage of illegal market items occur in failed countries, rather
than in the more wealthy regions where the items will be distributed, in order to reduce the cost
and risk to predatory criminal organizations.
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“Organized crime” is a general term that covers an extensive list of unlawful groups;
however, the term “predatory organized crime” refers specifically to activities that have
deliberate structural functions. Of particular functional interests are all the illegal activities
which results in increase profit margins. These functions are accentuated by the surrounding
population, economy, and governing structures. There are existing societal roles that contribute
to the formation, operation, and expansion of predatory organized crime networks. For example,
there are needs within the criminogenic groups that can be satisfied by the migration of certain
people, like the lower working class. In other words, predatory organized crime groups prey
upon certain entire segments of society, such as a group of working poor whom it would be
advantageous to displace. Also, this concept of societal roles in relation to criminal opportunities
is explored later in chapter two.
The structure of failed nation-states makes possible unique economic opportunities for
predatory crime groups; in such nation-states, groups can operate without serious resistance from
regional governments, citizens, or foreign countries. Due to their colonial history, inhabitants of
failed nation-states are accustomed to foreign exploitation. This exploitation comes in various
forms, including removal of natural resources, departure of higher IQ citizens, and depletion of
high-paying jobs. Thus, economic opportunities for organized crime groups can include a cheap
or free work force, unencumbered illegal trafficking of various products, and access to secluded
regions of the world. The present study looks exclusively at failed nation-states, using a list of
nation-states that was extracted from the Failed State Index (Shaw, 2003), and uses the failed
nation-state as a unit of analysis.
The severity of a nation’s failure is measured according to certain indicators. The
indicators for a failing nation-state fall into three categories: economic productivity, institutional
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stability, and political stability. For this study, economic productivity is measured through a
nation’s GDP and through its wastefulness of government spending. Institutional stability is
measured through a nation’s rate of human flight and refugee/IDP count. Political stability is
measured through the number of external interventions, the level of voice and accountability, and
through the level of political stability and non-violence.
For many failed nation-states, an assortment of crime, social-political change, violence,
and societal problems occur in unhealthy numbers and structures, causing concentrated issues for
governing systems in neighboring countries throughout the nearby regions (Anderson &
Gunnarson, 2003; Shaw, 2003; Cole, 2006; Hamm, 2007; Phillips, 2007). Various forms of
predatory organized crime thrive within failed states, and to some extent, throughout the global
community. In more concrete terms, structured crime groups primarily subsist on transnational
criminal activities such as the illegal sex industry, drug and human trafficking, identity theft, and
other international activities (Newman, 1999; Abadinsky, 2006; Lunde, 2006).
Organized crime groups are traditionally hierarchical enterprises that are operated by
unlawful individuals with the motivation of participating in illegal activity, most often for
monetary benefit, in transnational, national, or local boundary networks. Unlawful individuals
are criminals who are engaged in illegal activity for a living, and for the purposes of this study,
the operation of predatory organized enterprises is the illegal activity of interest.
In recent years, the spot light has been concentrated on groups such as the Mafia and
various cartels; however, in reality, ,various ethnic-centered groups and local gangs are key
partners in the network of predatory organized crime (Soothill, 1996; Frisby, 1998; Finckenauer,
2004; Kraul, Connell, and Lopez; 2005). In general, where criminal enterprises are concerned,
neighboring gangs collect and shift unprocessed materials and drugs in small quantities, extend
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communication channels, recruit potentially useful emigrants, set up operational tools, and
supply a diversity of services for the larger international crime groups (Shaw, 2008). Ethniccentered gangs, based in their ethnically concentrated enclaves, control prostitution rings, amass
money from illegal immigrants who sell drugs to users and individual small dealers, operate
minor gambling institutions, have legitimate cover-up occupations, manipulate business
disagreements for economic gain, and extort business establishments under the guise of being
professional hired protection (Finckenauer, 2004; Shaw, 2008).
By creatively manipulating new communication and transportation technologies, most
organized criminal enterprises are now able to widen their affiliations and partnerships and
spread their business across regional and national borders (Aguilar-Millan et al., 2008)
Predatory organized crime groups feed like parasites upon developing nation-states that
are in need of sustainable economic and political maturation. Parasites require that their host
survive--but survive with minimum strength, unable to defend itself from the parasite. Actually,
parasites attack the defense system of the host until the functionalities of the host are under the
control of the parasite. In much the same way, predatory organized crime groups act as parasites,
hijacking host nation-states' economic systems and state functions. This is accomplished by
controlling them and by inspiring them with fear. A weak nation-state will continue to exist in
form and structure, but it will not be capable of posing any threat to organized crime groups.
This is the ideal environment for criminal groups that are seeking to build global and regional
influence.
In contrast to illegal business exchanges in which services, prohibited products, and
goods are exchanged among consenting individuals, predatory crime groups use extortion and
fraud to inflict oppressive financial costs and physical risks on legal businesses. They are
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therefore believed to be among the most difficult obstacles to a nation-state's economic
development (Cheng, 1997; Kattoulas, 2002; Sun, 1999). These predatory criminal
establishments wrest proceeds from victims through the employment of threats and violence
against legitimate businesses, and they impede the nation-state’s legitimate economic activity
(The Economist, 2000; Schelling, 1971). Predatory organized crime continues to operate largely
unnoticed, even though it has been a destructive force since the early 1990s (Sung, 2004; Cox,
1987). Some even argue that the roots of organized crime can be found in post-World War II
colonial globalization strategies. The colonial paradigm has influenced not only the criminal
population but also the impoverished population, thereby indirectly contributing to the predatory
organizations’ profit margins.
Failed nation states are residue of the colonial expansion and rule that took place
throughout Africa and the Americas after the two major world wars. Small nations were born in
this post-WWII period that operated with little efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability.
Nation-states that developed through colonial rule had inefficient economic plans based on the
extraction of natural resources through local governing policies for the benefit of foreign global
powers. Moreover, the nation-states had ineffective governing bodies that were mere shadow
leaders operating on behalf of foreign governments that sought to manipulate local policy to
improve their own wealth. The sustainability of each nation-state was compromised from its
initial construction.
The governments of the states that are currently weak nation-states were designed to
benefit foreign colonial powers, not the local citizenry. As a result, the objectives and strategies
adopted by these local governments predisposed their regions to failure. Once each region failed,
it would be primed for foreign exploitation. Over time, colonial rule dwindled and was replaced
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by economic dominance over small nation-states by way of debt. The nation-states borrowed and
owed vast amounts of money to ruling global powers. This began a trajectory towards failure and
left a leadership vacuum within the failed nation-states. This is where organized crime groups
such as predatory crime networks capitalized on the opportunity to expand their businesses at the
expense of weak governments.
Earlier research on the methodical organized criminal behavior of nation-states was
confined to the United States and Italy (Sung, 2004).However, work by scholars in the early
2000s has sparked new analysis of and interest in this issue (Shaw, 2008). Even though
attention from government agencies and scholars will not be enough to solve this problem, it is a
start; one hopes that eventually there will be global awareness of predatory organized crime and
its correlation with populations in poverty. There remains an opportunity for more cross-national
comparisons of predatory organize crime trends in poor nation-states. This is due in part to the
noticeable national differences concerning the problem and the varying degrees of success with
which predatory organized crime has been engaged across global communities.
The generality of this study’s cross-national comparisons will allow for its conclusions
to be transferred from one nation-state to another. Some societies that have minimized the
harmful effects of criminal groups can thus offer potential policy recommendations to other
countries seriously affected by the organized crime problem. Moreover, this study’s statistical
analysis will motivate other scholars to collect and examine data to extend critical understanding
of the proximity factor, that is, the influence of nations with low levels of predatory crime on
nations with high levels of predatory crime. Organized crime should be evaluated with respect to
its organizational bases, criminal activities, structural models, and other essential patterns or
characteristics. No data source exists that can measure the direct inputs and outcomes of an
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organized crime unit; therefore, this study will investigate the patterns of governments and
people in response to global crime. For a systematic understanding, a chronological and
contextual review of organized crime and governing efforts to combat criminal groups is
evaluated. Also in this study, attention is given to the major social forces surrounding and
supporting organized crime. From political instability to economic failure, there are various
indicators associated with the functionality of predatory organized crime. There have also been
progressions in the communication and transportation due to globalization, and this has
influenced profit growth for criminal organizations.

Study Objectives
This study tests the generalizability of two observations frequently reported in past
single-society research in a sample of 133 countries (Sung, 2004; Shaw, 2003; Shaw, 2008).
One observation is directed towards the health of economic indicators. While the second
observation focus more on the health of political indicators. The key explanatory constructs
examined in the study are extensions of state political instability and economic failure. Scholars
agree that single-country observations indicate that a failure by the state to supply physical safety
to the populace, and to honor commercial contracts and property rights, generates a social
environment saturated by a deficiency of trust (Gambetta, 1993; Rabasa & Chalk, 2001; Varese,
1997).
Protection and enforcement systems conducted by organized crime groups become an
alternative to the trust that evaporates in the failure of nation-states (Sung, 2004). To return to
the parasite-host analogy, crime groups parasitically begin to perform the functions of the
victimized host. As nation-states fail, criminal groups gradually garner strength. Criminal
13

organizations operate as an authoritarian “parasitic” state, and in the absence of any alternatives,
can be mistaken for genuine by the desperately poor population (Shelly, 1999).

Through predatory criminal activities, these organizations infiltrate governmental
agencies and produce avenues for abuse of state powers (Carter, 2001). When no battle is
waged to control or minimize predatory criminal organizations’ infiltration of legitimate, legal
businesses, extortion becomes an ordinary method of conducting business. The efficiency
potential of the nation-state’s economy is exhausted, and its competitiveness - on the global
market economy is compromised (Goldman, 1996; Meyer & Green, 1996).
Scholars insist that persistent organized crime groups grow parasitically due to a
combination of deteriorating economic surroundings, shifting economic regulation, and
confidence in an underground economy; these groups can ultimately give rise to selfperpetuating economic system that destroys some of its own productive processes (Lotspeich,
1995; Strange, 1995). Predatory criminal enterprises infest a nation-state while destroying its
stability and economic potential.
The relationship between statistical extensions of state instability and economic failure,
and the role of these phenomena in feeding predatory organized crime, is the primary interest of
this study. In an effort to understand the relationships between state and economic failure, there
are three goals that this study will pursue. First, the study will test the degree to which variables
that imply economic failure and political instability correlate with predatory organized crime.
The second goal of this study is to determine the extent of the relationship between the social and
economic indicators and predatory organized crime in multiple nations. The final goal is to
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examine the future implications of predatory organized crime predictor variables in the context
of national strategies to eradicate or reduce organized crime.

This study intends to use theoretical evidence to identify the structural patterns within the
organizational constructs of predatory crime. Theoretically, the research will seek to link
behavior traits associated with predatory crime to concepts found in network governance and
globalization. Globalization describes the landscape in which predatory networks currently
exist: a landscape marked by rapid communication, advanced technology, and readily available
transportation. Network governance theory speaks to the organizational structure adopted by
criminal units to successfully maneuver through the fast-paced global landscape.
Once identified, the study will correlate the organizational behavior of predatory crime
groups to economic and political outcomes. This project is framed as an ecological study
because such a study design is suited to an examination of group patterns. This model will also
make possible an analysis of the theoretical principles that formulate the global landscape and
structure of predatory organized crime networks. In other words, this study design will enable
you to analyze the underlying principles of how predatory organized crime works. The
importance of using an ecological design is discussed in length in Chapter 3. The findings will
prove useful for policy analysts who are working to create laws that will minimize or eliminate
predatory organized crime.
Under the guidance of an ecological research framework, this study has formulated five
different hypotheses regarding the association between the response variable (a latent variable of
predatory organized crime) and each of the covariates. A cross sectional study design was
formulated to investigate the ecological correlates of predatory crime rates in multiple nations.
15

The ecological design allows for an examination of the differences between groups rather than
between individuals. The groups in this study are defined by the Failed Nation-state Index
(multiple group design), and the units of comparison are group-level. There is at least one
variable measured at the group level on indicators such as GDP, population size, crime rate, etc.
Also, there are variables measured at one point in time in order to give snapshot results by way
of cross-sectional design.

Theoretical Framework
The behavior of modern criminal networks is theoretically explained by network
governance frameworks. In this section, the impacts of global technologies, communication, and
transportation on organized crime networks are assessed. The global influence on the structure of
predatory crime will give insight into which political strategies can best hinder this type of
criminal organization.

Network Governance Theory
Predatory crime groups specialize in creating, through legal means, business ventures that
promote government dysfunction. Each business venture is strategically processed, planned, and
implemented in a failed nation-state in a way that is explicable through network governance
theory. This theory is a hybrid between transaction cost economics and network theory. When
we say that many organized crime groups operate within the channel of network governance, we
mean that they practice a form of coordination that is characterized by informal social systems
rather than by bureaucratic structures within groups and formal contractual relationships between
them. Such cooperation is done in an effort to coordinate complex products or services in
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uncertain and competitive environments (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Powell, 1990; Ring & Van de
Ven, 1992; Snow, Miles, & Coleman, 1992). A predatory crime group can take on the
appearance of a corporate structure, but it actually consists of a network of closely related peers.
The social system is informal and takes the form of relational associations. Coordination is a
result of either family or relational trust amongst members.
Although crime groups have the potential to control an entire nation-state, such
organizational growth is by no means assured. This uncertainty stems from diverse global
policing efforts held together by loose ties among competent nation-states. A global justice effort
focused on a specific region has the potential to shift the balance of powers in the organized
criminal world. The potentiality of power shifts drives the competition in the organized crime
network.
At any time, a particular crime group can fall from global prominence if a transaction
fails, if a crime lord expires, or if the group becomes the focus of government regulation. A fall
from power is linked to a crime organization’s inability to increase its profit margins. The
primary objective of predatory organized crime groups is to accumulate funds, and this is
achieved through the work of a selective, structured set of autonomous groups engaged in
manufacturing products and in sinking production costs.
The theoretical principle of network governance explains the operational behavior of
predatory crime groups. Network governance is a fusion of social network theory and
transaction cost economics. Transaction cost economics (TCE) offers a comparative platform for
analyzing varying governance types (Williamson, 1994).The theory of TCE can be further used
to forecast where network governance is likely to surface (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997).
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Earlier scholars have suggested that TCE has provided evidence that relational
contracting is the underpinning for an alternate governance type (Eccles, 1981; Jarillo, 1988;
Mariotti & Cainarca, 1986). Blending TCE and social network theory with the network
governance paradigm leads to an understanding of transaction costs and government influence in
organized crime. The exchange or transaction of goods in an underground environment requires
a trust that exists within embedded mutual parties. The term “structural embeddedness,” in a
social context, refers to the environment surrounding economic exchange, and it is a vital
component to relational contracting (Granovetter, 1985). Structural embeddedness accounts for
the existence of individual relationships that manipulate economic activity (Granovetter, 1992).
The shifting of relationships among actors is reflected in the changing levels of economic
transactions.
The network governance social context is further infused with the TCE framework through a
description of the social apparatuses that influence the monetary value of economic exchanges
(Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). In order for structural embeddedness to function,
transactional environments require elevated levels of organizational flexibility, synchronization,
and safeguarding influence (Snow, Miles, & Coleman, 1992). Structural embeddedness creates
the social platform that hosts the exchanges described by network governance theory (Acevedo
& Common, 2006). Structural embeddedness grants a basis for social mechanisms to coordinate
and preserve exchanges (Burn, 2004). Social mechanisms interrelate to create an exchange
system where coordination and collaboration among sovereign parties lead to customized
exchanges. Predatory organized crime units (POCs) exploit their familiarity with the local
citizenry, government officials, and business sector of failing nation-states to weave together
networks of profit-driven partners. POCs embed themselves within the community by hiring,
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protecting, and threatening the local people. A strong government can prevent POCs from
appropriating the citizens’ trust by providing the services that POCs would otherwise provide.
However, POCs utilize structural benefits; influenced by network governance, which suffocates
the resources of weak governments. Even in a nation-state with a relatively strong government,
POCs can work to suffocate the legitimate government and sabotage its efforts to provide
resources.

Global Networks
The concept of network organization (Miles & Snow, 1986) applies to inter-group
associations that are characterized by informal social systems, as distinct from bureaucratic
structures and contractual relationships (Gerlach, 1992; Nohria, 1992). The inter-group social
system is referred to as network governance. Network governance represents a "distinct form of
coordinating an economic centered activity" (Powell, 1990); it is a form of coordination that
competes with markets and hierarchies. Global communities, corporations, and governments
have all created links of cause and effect among fellow nation-states, regardless of proximity.
The decisions and actions of one nation-state can cause a ripple of responses in neighboring or
linked nation-states. For example, the economy of a government entity in one region can
influence the economy of even a distant nation-state. As a result, constant change has become the
new norm that defines the condition of interconnected economies and markets.
A new technology has the potential to revolutionize an industry in a short period of time,
rendering an individual’s expertise insignificant or an organization’s mission obsolete, and
possibly prompting a flourish of strategic innovations (Salamon, 2002). Globalization has
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created a platform on which change can occur more rapidly and frequently than ever before. The
new platform that is globalization has required changes in how people interact. To be precise,
two revolutions had to take place in order for globalization to take hold: the growth of low-cost
mass-transit facilities and the growth of international telecommunications (Aguilar-Millan et al.,
2008).
As these revolutions — the freeing of markets, the transportation revolution, and the
Internet revolution — were taking place, the way in which the world works was also changing
(Aguilar-Millan et al., 2008). With globalization came a growing international economic,
political, legal, and cultural interconnectedness based on advances in technological
communications, the removal of trade barriers underpinned by neo-liberal economics and
politics, and the formulation of directives in international law (Muncie, 2005). Interconnected
international interactions involve various factors, such as global communication networks, an
international surge of knowledge and data, and global civil societies (Kim, Tae, Karen, & Zurlo,
2008). Globalization has led to the interdependence of market systems around the world
(Stiglitz, 2006). The location of various regions no longer presents barriers to communication,
networking, or dependency.
Global networks influence social, market, and political demands, thereby causing shifts in
international population patterns. The mass of refugees that has been stirred up by the constant
change throughout the world serves as a constant aide memoire of what can happen to any
person who is overtaken by the dynamics of the new global system (Gould, 2000). A new world
order has emerged wherein stability and predictability are practically absent, and the only
constant that exists is the change in organizations, communities, and nations (Balfour & Grubbs,
2000). Richard Sennett (1998) argued that changes to an organization, in particular to the
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organizational structure, have ripple effects on the individual workers within the organization.
Therefore, predatory crime lords have not only to adjust to external factors of change but also to
internal factors of change; they must adjust both to structure and to workers.

The pace of change in predatory organized crime networks means that there is no long
term consistency (Balfour & Grubbs, 2000). Flexibility and change at the organizational crime
level, necessary to survive in the global economy, also mean that individual criminal members
must be flexible and expect to change job skill sets throughout their illegal careers (Salamon,
2002; Balfour & Grubbs, 2000). Depending upon the nature and direction of the change made
by an illegal organization, individual criminals may have to adopt totally new abilities and ways
of thinking (Frahm & Martin, 2009). Under the worst circumstances, change indicators for a
criminal organization may result in lower-level workers being no longer relevant (Sennett, 1998).
A transnational crime organization may move through networks of partners,
collaborators, skills, objectives, and directional efforts, requiring a flexible organizational
structure. Pressure is on predatory crime groups to continue adapting to the current field's
organizational structure. The traditional hierarchical organizational structure, which is currently
popular in organized crime, is being constantly improved by the influence of the governance
paradigm. Elements within the governance paradigm will allow for global government networks
to learn of the future potential growth in illegal organizations. The organizational structure and
behavior of POCs enables them to manipulate the political and economic life in failed nationstates.
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Governance
The days when bureaucracy, stable lines of authority, and routine were valued have
passed. Today people value the flexibility to act autonomously within networks. Globalization
has changed the demands upon and the expectations of organizations, supervisors, managers, and
frontline workers even in the organized crime enterprises. Crime lords want workers who can
think on their feet and adroitly adjust to swift change because criminal leaders retain the right
(flexibility) to reduce the workforce at any instance for the benefit of criminal network (Balfour
& Grubbs, 2000). Although hired staff is given freedom within limits, it would be erroneous to
assume that more flexibility translates into more autonomy for workers. Instead, the progression
away from bureaucratic structure to more flexible forms of organization has meant the
substitution of one structure of power and control for another, less perceptible form of control
(Frahm & Martin, 2009).
Sennett (1998, pp. 46-63) identifies three key interrelated mechanisms for creating and
sustaining more flexible organizations: (a) discontinuous reinvention of institutions, (b) flexible
specialization, and (c) concentration without centralization. According to Sennett, discontinuous
reinvention refers to creating, in the name of greater efficiency and productivity, organizational
forms and patterns of behavior that are more flexible than rigid hierarchies. Flexible
specialization refers to being able to adapt to perpetual change by generating additional products
to be introduced the market rapidly (Sennett, 1998). The last mechanism, concentration without
centralization, refers to vertical disaggregation and delayering that keeps power concentrated in
the center while decentralizing the operations of an organization (Sennett, 1998). These key
mechanisms by Sennett are similar to the movement from a government paradigm to a
governance paradigm. Constant change in the global economy is leading to more flexible
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learning criminal organizations, described by Sennett, in both public and private sectors and falls
within the descriptions of the governance paradigm.
Traditional criminal groups have adopted structures that shadowed the government under
the government paradigm framework. However, global forces are making it much harder for
predatory crime groups to function like top-down governments. The government paradigm is
optimized when centralized hierarchical agencies are delivering standardized services. According
to Salamon (2002), underlying much of the governance reform surge is a set of theories that
depict government agencies as tightly structured hierarchies shielded from market forces and
from effectual civilian demands and therefore free to serve the personal and institutional interests
of bureaucrats instead.
Governance involves an elaborate system of third-party government agencies in which
crucial elements of public authority are shared with a host of nongovernmental or othergovernmental actors, frequently in complex collaborative systems that sometimes defy
comprehension (Salamon, 2002). Third parties are as much or even more engaged in the
implementation and management of the public’s business than the government. In failed nationstates, the third parties are often corrupt criminal enterprises with more influence than any
nearby government agency. Varying neoliberal theories would suggest that the third party
collaborators are international corporations that benefit from corruption in isolated regions of the
world. However, what is more important than who the third party is, is fact that the government
is playing a diminished role in meeting civilian needs.
The selection of the five hypotheses, in the next section, derived from theoretical
significant explanations. Theoretically as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for a nation
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dwindles statistically the ability for that government to provide social services decreases. The
concept of GDP in reference to imports, exports and transnational exchanges is evidence of
globalization theoretical underpinnings. Globalization feed into the idea that the health of one
nation is interdependent on the health of other nations. The unstable economic condition
reflected in a drop of GDP causes a failing government to transfer social control to predatory
crime groups through monetary waste of government funds on third party criminally produced
services. Wasteful spending occurs when the monetary investment brings little to no value to the
local civilian population. Wasteful spending is a reflection of political decisions. The decisions
of uninformed corrupted governing officials results in economically draining partnerships, faulty
political collaborations and deprived citizenry. Network globalization theory references the need
for partnerships and collaboration rather than isolationist models of governing international
interaction. In response to the poor living circumstances, and in line with globalization theory,
underserved civilians turn to a migrant (human flight) lifestyle and become refugees in search of
services and labor. The willingness to travel for labor is not exclusive to modern times but the
idea of a vague association with a set land location or boundary is evidence of globalization. The
remaining few citizens with influence shifted into the role of fractionalized elites and eventually
eliminated. Fractionalized elites stand as growing obstacle by predatory crime networks.
Predatory crime lords then establish loose aligned partnerships in efforts to expand their
consumer base and profit margins internationally.
Sennett's key mechanisms reflect the governance paradigm of weaker hierarchy and
looser partnerships. Predatory crime groups thrive as members of the third party collaborate
with corrupt governments in solving public issues. Various components of the governance
paradigm have been documented in global organizations (Martin & Stutte, 2008; Kettner,
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Moroney & Martin, 2008; Abramson, Bruel & Kamensky, 2006; Agranoff, 2003; Goldsmith &
Eggers, 2004; Daly, 2003; Salamon, 2002). Some aspects of organized crime have experienced
and embraced the governance thought process while other sectors of organized crime have yet to
even hear of the rising governance paradigm. Governance is concerned with the relationship
between the government and the governed, and with how social and other public policies are
conceptualized and addressed (Frahm & Martin, 2002). Sehested (2003) describes the
relationships between government and third parties as a partnership in which “[n]o single actor,
public or private, has the all-encompassing knowledge, overview, information, or resources to
solve complex and diversified problems” (89).
In the governance model, input from each stakeholder is considered to be as valuable as
input from any other voice in the network of actors. The implications of this governance
paradigm for organized crime are major because solutions to complex social problems are not
considered to be the eminent domain of government, but rather are seen to reside at the
intersection of all disciplines and all sectors (Johansson, 2004). This includes criminal networks
as well as corrupted governments. The paradigm shift is currently underway, so that right now both the governance and government models co-exist. However, technology is gradually making
the governance paradigm increasingly relevant for the growing predatory criminal enterprise.

Hypotheses

Based on the conceptual argument stated in the previous sections, hypotheses and
research questions that deal with the institutional sources of predatory organized crime are
formulated. First, though, three research questions will be posed in the following section.
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The more impactful research question combines and compares political instability and
economic failure. This question will help scholars, policy-makers, and officials to identify which
aspects of nation-state failure should receive more focus in policy implementation. The three
research questions are as follows:


Is political instability more influential than economic failure in explaining the variability
in predatory organized crime in multiple nations?



Does political instability explain some variation in predatory organized crime in multiple
nations?



Does economic failure explain some variation in predatory organized crime in multiple
nations?

In the following paragraphs, each hypothesis and research question will be discussed.
According to the null hypothesis, there is insufficient evidence to say conclusively that
the association between Predatory Organized Crime and GDP, holding the other predictor
variables constant, is different from zero.

vs

According to the null hypothesis, the association between Predatory Organized Crime and
Wastefulness of Government Spending, holding the other predictor variables constant, is
different from zero.

vs
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According to the null hypothesis, the association between Predatory Organized Crime and
Human Flight, holding the other predictor variables constant, is different from zero.

vs

According to the null hypothesis, the association between Predatory Organized Crime and
Refugees and IDPs, holding the other predictor variables constant, is different from zero.

vs

According to the null hypothesis, the association between Predatory Organized Crime and
Fractionalized Elites, holding the other predictor variables constant, is different from zero.

vs

State Political Instability
Political instability is defined in terms of a nation-state’s ability to sustain political
functions that support and govern social services and citizen participation (Shaw, 2008). State
political instability is indicated through two themes, namely, institutional stability and political
stability. These two aspects of state functioning, institutional stability and political stability, will
be evaluated in terms of their relationship to predatory organized crime. Both combine to create
political instability. The stability of a state’s institutions grants predictability to its political
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processes, an impartial and effective judiciary guarantees individual rights, and the protection of
political stability permits members of society to vote and to compete for public offices (Sung,
2004). The degree to which these political goals are accomplished is predicted to be inversely
correlated with organized crime activities.

Economic Failure
Economic failure is defined as a government’s inability to sustain financial obligations
and thus to provide resources for the benefit of its citizens and overall health of the country
(Sung, 2004). Economic failure is indicated in this study through economic productivity.
Wastefulness of government spending and GDP are the variables to be used in the present
evaluation of a nation’s economic productivity. An underground economy is interpreted as an
indication of distributive inefficiency and weak public finance, while economic productivity and
output are considered to establish a nation-state's standard of living (Sung, 2004). Whereas an
underground economy is expected to directly vary with changes in the level of organized crime,
productivity and output are anticipated to be inversely connected to organized crime.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Predatory Organized Crime (POC) is associated with particular criminal actions and
network formations (Shaw, 2008). Professional, structured crime groups strategize activities,
locate new associates, engage affiliates, select missions, supervise criminal projects, and pursue
monetary business ventures (Cohen, 1977). Due to their organized networks, criminal
enterprises are capable of committing intentional acts with a global impact. Intentional actions
may include the trafficking of drugs and human beings through astonishing techniques, including
conspiracy with tarnished members of government, mass manipulation of a localized citizenry,
public threats, and synchronized aggression (Edelhertz & Overcast, 1993). Organized crime
appears in diverse forms that vary according to region and level of resources.

Historical Perspective
The Mafia
The Mafia has filled the research agendas of scholars more than any other international
organized crime group (Shaw, 2008). A small island in Italy, Sicily, is the location of origin of
the traditional Mafia. Sicily lies along a tactical Mediterranean trade route, which often placed
the population of the small island in vulnerable positions (Albini, 1971). The term “Mafia”
emphasizes that the group is a sort of family that provides a 'safe haven' for fortitude and
endurance (Lewis, 1964; Inciardi, 1975). Over the centuries, the Sicilian territory has been
overrun by consecutive foreign aggressors, including great nations such as the ancient Romans.
Over time, Sicilians came to associate safety with the power of their family units (Block &
Scarpitti, 1985). When Sicilians migrated to America, the harsh and unfamiliar new
surroundings caused them to fall back on their families as safe havens (Ianni, 1972).
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Paradoxically, Sicilian family units foundationally grounded in securing reliance, devotion, and
allegiance also became a successful and dependable medium through which Sicilians were able
to establish power and gain distinction in the criminal enterprise (Cohen, 1955). By the late
1940s, Sicilian crime families were thriving so much that they established the Sicilian Mafia as a
legendary organized illegal crime community (Shaw, 2008). Ever since, the Mafia has defined
organized crime in the popular imagination. However, in some ways the definition set socially by
the Mafia stereotypically limited the scope of organized crime's evolutionary potential. In the
minds of most people, organized crime is seen as the Italian families of the 1900s, in the US,
operating interstate illegal activities. However, there have been expansions in size, location, and
form of organized crime around the world. Over time, the traditional Sicilian family
organizational structure has adapted to the new global economy, and this adaptation has
influenced other criminal groups.

Crime Groups
Organized crime has evolved beyond the years of the early Mafia to include a variety of
groups across various international regions (Gounev & Bezlov, 2009). Crime networks exist
across the globe in territorial clusters, based in a given country, racial or ethnic culture, or
geographical region (Paoli, 2003). There are criminal enterprise groups that concentrate their
operations in counterfeiting, drug and human trafficking, extortion, contrabands, or gambling
(Shaw, 2008). Additionally, there are criminal project-oriented networks that are amassed or
dissolved in reaction to particular objectives or opportunities (Godson & Olson, 1995). As a
result of transnational business maneuvers, organized crime groups institute and sustain
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customized conditional relationships with other crime groups (Gounev & Bezlov, 2009).
Transnational crime groups are as dedicated to legal business transactions as they are to illegal
ones. Eastern transnational criminal networks have many members in numerous sub-units that
engage in prostitution, extortion, and the movement of drugs (Shaw, 2008). Other transnational
crime groups are integrated business units dedicated to the administration of every facet of drugs,
from growing and processing drugs, to transporting and distributing them to available markets
(Aguilar-Millan et al., 2008). There are predatory organized crime groups that concentrate on an
array of business ventures including illegal immigration, gambling, money laundering,
prostitution, drugs, and racketeering to loaning money in indigenous communities (Shaw, 2008).
Some criminal networks retain large numbers of recruits throughout several gangs in regions
around or within a given controlled boundary (Finckenauer & Voronin, 2001). Predatory groups
infiltrate local and foreign governing institutions and collaborate with other organized crime
groups across the world (Shaw, 2008). Globally, organized crime benefits from various illegal
activities, including prostitution, the drug trade, the exchanging of weapons, human trafficking,
extortion, money laundering, counterfeiting, and delivery of nuclear equipment (Shelley, 2003).

Organized Crime Commonalities
Research indicates that most organized crime groups share the same essential elements.
First, organized crime consists of conspiratorial activity (Maltz, 1994). In particular, the activity
entails the synchronization of a network of criminals in the preparation for and administration of
illegal transactions. Also, an organized crime group's activities may include the quest for a
legitimate business by unlawful strategies (Maltz, 1994). Second, organized crime demands
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loyalty and commitment from lead members and close affiliates, who provide expert talents and
products (Cohen, 1955). Guiding principles and procedural regulations are precisely detailed
throughout the organizational structure. Violations of customary protocol are immediately
evaluated and addressed. Retributive punishment can come in various forms, including violent
measures; some examples include substantive loss, bodily injuries, threats, and death, to the
guilty individual and his or her associates (Short, 1991). Third, organized crime groups exist in
hierarchical structure, although they do not necessarily operate hierarchically (Shaw, 2008).
Each organized crime group has a high-ranking member who leads committees, and the
committee directs close subordinates in conducting illegal acts (Statewatch, 1994). However,
networks and collaborative efforts are also a part of the operational process, so that different
crime groups participate in shared criminal acts. The sequence of authority is preserved with
profit sharing, various ranks, and status (Short, 1991). However, status and ranks are easily
redistributed when lower members murder their superiors. Nonetheless, this organizational
network can only be productive when inter-group trust, informal relational partnerships, and a
sense of shared risk permeates the enterprise (Cohen, 1955).
Fourth, organized crime aims at economic gain as its primary goal (Shaw, 2008). While
profit is the main goal, a desire for power and status are the byproducts that further motivate
organized crime (Aguilar-Millan et al., 2008). To achieve or maximize economic gain,
organized crime groups tend to maintain a monopoly on the illegal goods or services in which
they specialize (Shaw, 2008). Fifth, exploitation remains a critical tool used by organized crime
groups in the course of manipulating people's fear and greed with various predatory stratagems
(Cohen, 1977).
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Organized crime groups use arson, kidnapping, violence, and threats to diminish the
effectiveness of legitimate businesses and soundness of the general community. In addition,
crime groups often exploit the greed of government employees by offering financial
contributions in order to corrupt them (Maltz, 1994). Sixth, the limitations of the criminal
enterprises do not restrict their potential productivity in illegal business operations (Short, 1991).
The illegality of these criminal organizations does not prevent them from operating in the world
of legitimate business. Organized crime strategically utilizes legitimate businesses for illegal
projects (Statewatch, 1994). In studying the history of organized crime groups in the United
States, one finds evidence of their attempts to avoid the stigmatized image of the murderous
gangster by using legal tactics whenever possible. Predatory crime groups engage in legal
activities for illegal benefits (Edelhertz & Overcast, 1993). For example, a criminal enterprise
might collect funds for unions and operate minor capitalization stock transactions on behalf of
inexpert shareholders (Shaw, 2008). Finally, organized crime resembles organizational
constructs that are described by network governance theory.
Network governance theory will be discussed later; for now, the key point is that this
theory, if it can be applied to organized crime, indicates that organized crime groups will evolve
over time into intricate new networks and criminal strategies. Evolving over time includes
selecting and using modes of communication, means of transport, modern weaponry, strategic
responses to social pressures, forms of business, and even styles of administration (Gounev &
Bezlov, 2009). In the information age, various organized groups have already begun to actively
utilize the internet for many different purposes, especially for the transaction of prohibited
products (President's Commission on Organized Crime, 2001; United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime, 2005).
33

Context
The popular fascination with the mob has its roots in the news outlets and cover stories
that have sensationalized violent criminal behavior. The mass media have predominantly
influenced the public perception and reaction to organized crime, at least in America (Anderson
& Gunnarson, 2003). The customary order in which people receive information about organized
crime is, from first to last, as follows: news reports, academic studies, governmental
investigations, enactment of laws, and finally, prosecution of criminal cases (Shaw, 2003).
The initial key investigations in the U.S. have transpired on the federal level, including
those by the Committee on Mercenary Crimes in the 1930s. The Special Senate Committee to
Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce in the early 1950s created limitations for
criminal networks. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations from 1950 through
1960 was revolutionary in its attempt to identify hidden crime groups. President Lyndon
Johnson's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice from 1965 through
1970, and the President's Commission on Organized Crime from 1985 to 1990, established
fundamental rules for dissolving global underground commerce (Shaw, 2008).
The one inquiry that uncovered the criminal world and its organized enterprises occurred
in the 1960s. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, in the early 1960s,
acquired the witness of Joseph Valachi, a resentful ex- member of New York's Genovese crime
Family (Shaw, 2003). Joseph Valachi's evidence was a clear breach of the loyalty, dedication,
and trust elements of the family model adopted by crime groups. His testimony was the first
instance of infidelity by an active member, and it provided decisive evidence for the
administrative actions of an undisclosed criminal consortium by the La Cosa Nostra (United
States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 1990). The investigations were preceded by
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news reports and academic research, and the investigations were preceded by the formation of
new laws and prosecutions.

Laws and Legislation
Research suggests that governmental investigations tend to pave the way for formal
lawmaking and institutionalized reaction (United States Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, 1990). Indirectly, organized crime introduced a new way of making money beyond the
control of government. The history of legislation documents the learning curve of the US in
adjusting to this new breed of crime. As a response to legislation, organized crime groups were
thrust into evolving global markets, global networks, and global productions.
Among the first acts of legislation intended to fight organized crime was the Interstate
and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprise Act, passed in 1952
(Buscaglia & Van Dijk, 2003). The Act prohibits travel in interstate commerce or use of
interstate facilities with the intent to endorse, transmit, handle, or assist unlawful activities.
Gaming, subornment, extortion, property destruction, and liquor violations were all considered
unlawful under this Act (Shaw, 2008). In 1970, Congress passed the Organized Crime Control
Act (Buscaglia & Van Dijk, 2003). Title IX of the Act, known as the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), attacks racketeering activities by prohibiting the use of
racketeering as a means of bringing in revenue , accumulating advances, or conducting business,
and prohibiting the transfer of funds derived from racketeering in any enterprise implicated in
interstate commerce (Anderson & Gunnarson, 2003). To aid in prosecution, the Act even
authorizes the establishment of a Federal Witness Protection Program under which witnesses
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who testify in court are guaranteed new identities and other forms of protection against revenge
(Cole, 2006).
The successful implementation of RICO also prompted the FBI to adopt an enterprise
theory of investigation (Hamm, 2007). This theory, concentrated on the criminal enterprise, its
subsystems, and their operational processes (such as day-to-day communication, transportation,
and finance) builds a case against organized crime (McFeely, 2001). As the FBI developed an
understanding of this expanding criminal world and created legislation in order to discourage
such criminal acts, the rest of the world did the same, and an international defense against crime
groups ignited.

International Prevention Efforts
Internationally, debates over a possible United Nations response to transnational
organized crime, with its threat to the political, economic, and social fabric of member societies,
began in the 1990s (Aguilar-Millan et al., 2008). The International Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime was subsequently formulated, representing a strategic and
historic step in the global fight against illegitimate activities by criminal groups and enterprises
(President's Commission on Organized Crime, 2001). The Global Program against Transnational
Organized Crime, established under the Convention in the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, has since worked on the ratification of the Convention by individual nations (United
States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 1990). To promote the ratification of the
Convention, regional meetings were convened around the world (Shaw, 2008). Also, expert
group meetings were conducted to prepare legislative guides to the Convention and its three
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protocols (Anderson & Gunnarson, 2003). There were also national-level meetings in
cooperation with member states (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2005).
The Global Program against Transnational Organized Crime has made specific efforts in
the assessment of prevailing patterns and trends, the training of criminal justice practitioners, the
development of tools and technical assistance, and the sharing of information among member
states on transnational organized crime (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2005).
Multi-national efforts, such as the Global Program against Transnational Organized Crime, will
need to devise a theoretical framework for understanding organized crime.
Before one can analyze particular types, patterns, and characteristics of organized crime,
one must first understand in theoretical terms how criminal group members operate: to be
precise, one must understand network governance theory. Many elements of organized crime
resemble certain collaborative principles that can be described in terms of network governance
theory. Network governance theory provides insight into the prewired flexible elements within
the organizational structure adopted by predatory crime groups to optimize economic growth
potential through weak governments. Also, globalization theories paint the layout of a modern
neoliberal capitalistic world where predatory crime groups intertwine with one another and with
legitimate governments and businesses through partnerships and business ventures.

Membership Types
Organized crime enterprises practice their conspiratorial activities for the purposes of
profit, power, or status. Predatory organized crime involves a group of people in the planning
and execution of illegal activities or in the pursuit of a legal business venture by unlawful means
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(Shaw, 2008). The lowest level of assessment of organized crime groups are the people who are
brought together for a task. Organized crime groups divide into four categories: the familybased crime enterprise, the age-graded group, the race or ethnically based group, and the group
based on a shared language.
A family-based crime group is not essentially constructed on blood relations (Phillips,
2007). The historical foundation of this particular family-based category is the Mafia (Shaw,
2003). Members may come from a particular setting or association, sharing a distinctive
recollection of a native land or some life journey (Cole, 2006). Members also call each other
brothers and sisters (Hamm, 2007). They look up to higher-ranking members or to a leader as
their guide (Newman, 1999).
Age is the second commonality that can unite the members of an organized crime group.
An aged-graded crime organization attracts people from a specific age group (Abadinsky, 2006).
Members in the age range share a similar level of experience, education, or energy (Shaw, 2008).
The obvious example of groups in this age-centered category is a youth gang (Aguilar-Millan et
al., 2008).
The third category of organized crime group is the race or ethnicity-based group. This
category is characteristic of almost all organized crime groups (Shaw, 2008). Ethnicity-focused
organized crime groups are centered on membership of the same race or ethnicity for greater
mutual understanding, solidarity, and security (Soothill, 1996). Individuals of other races or
ethnicities may be used only as sponsored associates, global partners, or paid specialists (Frisby,
1998).
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The fourth category of group is based on a language connection. Although people of the
same race might share a similar language, one can also share language with people outside one’
own race. As English becomes the global tool of communication, there will be an amplified
number of crimes directed towards tourists, migrants, students, diplomats, multinational
corporate workers in the world and via internet by networks linked by the English language
(Fiandaca 2007; Phillips, 2007).

Criminal Activity Patterns
Activity patterns of organized crime groups fall into two categories of business
enterprises. One type is illegal business for big profit (Shaw, 2008). There are certain illegal
products (i.e. certain drugs) that are forbidden by nearly every country. Another criminal
activity, murder for hire, is seen as one of the most horrific crimes by law enforcement;
organized illegal groups market murder for hire in response to the demand in both the criminal
underground and the conventional world (James, 1975). Unlawful behavior such as prostitution
is illegal and socially stigmatized (Shaw, 2008). Predatory crime networks send women from
various small market countries to major metropolises to work as prostitutes (James, 2004).
Gambling actions are prohibited in most places by government or governing institutions (Sung,
2004). Nevertheless, criminal groups create alcoves in which the development of monopolies
on gambling rings throughout lucrative transnational market regions (Chin, 1999). The illegal
activities mentioned above are not exclusively isolated to the large criminal groups; nonetheless,
these illegal activities offer a wide range of profitable business opportunities.

39

The second type of criminal business enterprise for organized crime goes on largely
unnoticed. Organized crime groups conduct legal business using illegal methods such as
violence, harassment, and threats (Juska, Johnstone, & Pozzuto; 2004). Participation in legal
business is vital to organized crime groups. Such legitimate activities provide a business front to
hide underground operations, transfer illegal gains, legitimize problematic transactions, and
establish market influence (Kraul, Connell, & Lopez, 2005). For example, organized crime
groups are capable of blending into their social surroundings, forming a kind of symbiotic
relationship with law enforcement, political establishments, business communities, and the
general public (Kaplan and Dubro, 1986; Shaw, 2003). Within the community and among local
residents, organized crime groups settle disputes, engage in personal protection, and provide
general security (Aguilar-Millan et al., 2008). In trans-border relations between two nationstates, within the corporate world and with various businesses, organized crime groups recruit
day laborers to work for farms, shipping, and construction companies to evade the severe
immigration laws (United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime, 2005).
In some poor nations, , organized crime groups can afford to influence politics by
supplying services that range from financially supporting election campaigns, delivering
sensitive messages, and blocking media releases of sensitive data, to orchestrating links to
businesses and other lucrative interests (Aguilar-Millan et al., 2008). The larger and more
influential criminal enterprises benefit from a sort of reverence from the police, who admire the
groups’ faithfulness to a feudal-era code of chivalry (Shaw, 2008). Periodically, these criminal
enterprises offer up some of their lower members to assist the police in solving cases. More
importantly, the police to some degree count on the existence of these criminal enterprises for
dealing with street crime. When smaller criminal gangs come into a neighborhood and start
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creating problems, chances are good that the larger organized criminal enterprises will take care
of it before the police need (President's Commission on Organized Crime, 2001).

Illegal Business Characteristics
An organized criminal enterprise generally takes on one of two different business
characteristics: either the multinational corporate style or the small business style (McFeely,
2001). The multinational corporate style is employed in human trafficking, the drug trade, the
smuggling of weapons or other military equipment; internet based illegal activity, and the sex
trade (Graeme, 1999). In the business arena, this multinational style connects suppliers with
distributors, with retailers, and eventually with the consumer (Lunde, 2006).
The division of labor in a criminal organization typically involves separate units to carry
out the duties of operation and management, production and planning, and finance and security
(Hamm, 2007). The organizational structure is hierarchical, with the corporate headquarters and
branch facilities or offices, with core members and hired associates, and with a semi-chief
executive leader and frontline workers (Paoli, 2003).

An organized criminal enterprise under

the multinational corporate style can use scale, risk, international reach, social media influence,
law enforcement interest, and civic trepidation in its pursuit of high profit (Burton, 1997).
Influential criminal groups can effortlessly overrun a competing business, invade a market, or
oppress a group of competitors. Predatory crime networks, with their widespread control in
major transnational crime ventures, demonstrate the effectiveness of the multinational corporate
style in organized crime (Shaw, 2008).
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As an alternative to the corporate style of organization, organized criminal enterprises
might opt for the small business model, which flourishes on migrant labor, civil quarrels to
promote disorder, gambling, smuggling of contrabands, and prostitution (Brownstein, Crimmins,
& Spunt, 2000). The small business style affords organizations opportunities to have more
specialized interpersonal relationships, inter-group interactions, and cross-border transactions
(Burton, 1997). This style utilizes small teams, with each team member engaged in multiple
functions for different projects (Anderson, 1995). The team leaders also carry out multiple
functions, including initiation, planning, financial management, facilitation, and field supervision
(Bovenkerk, 200). In contrast to corporate-style groups, small organized crime groups minimize
cost through the flexibility of their transportation, the simplicity of their organization and
operation, their low profile, avoidance of media attention, and their ability to ward off any
possible law enforcement attacks (Sung, 2004). Although this small business style is not as
large-scale, highly coordinated, or threatening as an international illegal network, this style does
still permit the expansion of well-organized criminal groups that have lucid plans for increasing
profits and well-thought out tactics for operation (Gambetta & Reuter, 1997). Successful
criminal enterprises use the small business style to carry on as individual entrepreneurs thriving
in the westernized portion of the world (Shaw, 2008).

Political Transition
Within failed states across the globe, organized crime groups thrive on war, political
transition, economic development, cultural change, and social transformation (Lunde, 2006). T
Wars give birth to civic disorder and create gaps between demand and supply in labor, consumer
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goods, and military assets (Frisby, 1998). Political unrest deteriorates the governmental
institutions and their ability to maintain social stability and deliver important services (Wallis &
Dollery, 2001). Wars not only fan insurgency and terrorism, but they also fuel organized crime
and underground activities (Shaw, 2008). In addition, political transition influences the division
of power and the allotment of public resources. Breakdowns in government allow for criminal
enterprises to use violence, corruption, and other means to challenge or influence state authority
in the redistribution of public properties, especially in the regulations the state has to make
regarding the processes and outcomes of privatization (Juska, Johnstone, & Pozzuto, 2004).
Organized predatory crime groups acquire profitable state properties through use of
unfair and illegal means and then redistribute the land for their own financial gain. These same
organized networks also employ representatives of governments as associates so that they, the
criminal groups, can have command of businesses that need organized crime security. Predatory
crime groups finance their loyal members who campaign for and hold political office. Also, the
groups use money to gain influence over states’ domestic as well as foreign policies to the
benefit of the criminal enterprise (Shelly, 2003; Finckenauer, 2004). Opportunities for both
legitimate and illegitimate business undertakings are born out of economic development, cultural
change, and social transformation (Witt, Clarke, & Fielding, 1999). Organized crime groups
tend to be decisive in seizing new opportunities to obtain a profit in this ever-changing global
era.
A troubling pattern in organized crime is that it creates more violence in developing
countries than in developed ones. This is partly because of the stark economic contrast between
the rich and the poor; partly out of a reaction to police brutality, oppression by the regime, or
corruption by public officials; and partly because of a general state of cultural disorientation or
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social maladjustment. Crime groups in societies with weak economies and stalled democracies
often engage in kidnapping, assassination, massacre, and other hostile practices for monetary
gain (Lloyd, 1996).
Failed nation-states witness a number of kidnappings annually. Various kinds of
kidnappings occur, from expressive kidnapping to political kidnapping to kidnapping for money
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2005). Expressive kidnapping primary goal is to
deliver a message to a particular person or group. On the other hand, political kidnapping focus
on key legislative leaders for political influence. Kidnapping for money is clearly indicated by
its title. In addition to imposing immense pain on victims, kidnapping also spreads trepidation
through the community, disturbs social stability, and discourages business investments that are
so essential to societies that are struggling to develop economic development (Lotspeich, 1995).
In developed countries, by contrast, organized crime appears to develop into a form of
high-tech structure with industry leading institutionalized business practices. Predatory crime
enterprises have the capacity to penetrate unions, the corporate world, the governmental
bureaucracy, or the stock market (Shaw, 2008). Predatory organized crime can intermingle with
the corporate operations of developed nations.

Larger Social Forces
Identifying the larger social forces shaping predatory crime takes meticulous research.
Some researchers indicate that a failure of the state to deliver essential political goods such as
security, justice, and stability encourages criminal groups to step in and perform state functions.
Across the globe are weak states, some that are still in the shadow of colonialism or strongly
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under the influence of foreign interests, some that are caught between tradition and modernity,
some that are over-involved in either autocratic recklessness or democratic indecision, and still
others that are divided by civil wars or united as loose sovereign polities (Sung, 2004).
Political institutions that are engaged in battle against non-centralized armed rebels find it
difficult to establish security enforcement for their civilians who live in close proximity to war
zones - (Ejiogu, 2001). Civil and regional conflict generate ideal milieus in which both domestic
and international organized crime groups can rule on matters ranging from business protection,
local justice, shipments of arms, supplies of contrabands, and production of drugs to human trade
in sex and slavery (Shaw, 2008). A general weakness of the state reveals itself in a variety of
contexts, from the rigidity of bureaucracy to a lack of trained personnel, from massive waste to
extensive corruption, and from decision-making mistakes to carelessness in policy
implementation (Lipset, 1959). Crime groups may take advantage of rules, regulations, and
bureaucratic gaps for tactical organizational endurance. Also, criminal networks manipulate
corrupt officials into creating a passive government and favorable policy environment (Varese,
1997).
Parallel to the state failure hypothesis is an economic failure hypothesis on predatory
organized crime (Sung, 2004). According to this system of thought, poor economic outcomes-such as poor health, deprived living conditions, and dependence on an underground economy-propel the expansion of criminal syndicates as suppliers of goods in demand, services, and jobs
(Sung, 2004). Economic gaps that exist between rural and urban areas, developing and
developed regions, and poor and rich societies are staggeringly wide (Aguilar-Millan et al.,
2008). The rural-urban divide may alone account for much of organized crime in a variety of
areas across the globe.
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In major metropolitan areas with varying transportation units, political capitols, and
international centers of commerce, there is not only a substantial middle class living in relative
comfort, but also an elite class displaying their wealth through conspicuous consumption (Sutton,
2000). On the flip side, the majority of people in the rural areas acquire minimal income in their
daily fight for living endurance (Karatnycky, 2002). According to Shaw (2008), a farmer who
cultivates the earth laboriously from sunrise to sunset may still not be able to earn as much as
someone who digs up a “harvest” in the piles of waste discarded by city residents. The disparity
in income potential between rural and urban workers causes young, rural job seekers to depart
their homes in hopes of becoming migrant laborers in larger cities (Rawlison, 1998). These
migrant youths’ rebellion against their customary upbringing includes joining and participating
in organized criminal networks (Paoli, 2003). A massive pool of migrant labor is critical for
organized crime organizations because it provides both objectives and resources for organized
crime (Shaw, 2008).
In terms of objectives, the isolation of migrants in their new relocated area produces a
naive employment pool that can perform in as prostitutes, servants, or slaves (Skaperdas,
Stergios, & Syropoulos, 1995). Also in terms of resources, migrants are employed as aides,
guards, associates, members, and even core leaders for various organized crime groups (Sung,
2004). This same migrant population is the key to an expanding organized transnational
enterprise. When criminal networks connect between rural areas and urban centers, workers are
contracted for large projects, and normally the rural workers must migrate to the urban regions to
satisfy the details of the contract (Shaw, 2008).

46

Globalization
An additional element that enables organized crime to flourish is the spread of
communication and transportation technologies to even the inaccessible areas of the global
community (Weiss, 1998). Globalization has created concern in the form of national and
international reports from organizations that depict transnational organized crime as an inevitable
byproduct of increasing commercial, political, and social interactions across the globe through
contemporary technology, communication networks, and transportation (Passas, 1999).
Enhancement of communication and transportation technologies reduces barriers between states,
makes borders porous, and aids criminal groups in implementation (Mittelman & Johnston,
2009). Globalization has allowed for information to be shared over the internet, social media
platforms, and by mobile devices instantly collecting new ideas and plans for operations of
organized criminal enterprises (Bauman, 1998). Ships, buses, flights, and rails provide effective
vehicles for massive routine transactions for established and growing organized crime groups
(Shaw, 2008). Despite the range of economic progress, most nation-states utilize at least one
form of transportation technology to connect with distant regions (Beck, 2000). Like a
legitimate professional participant in international diplomacy, a member of an organized crime
group has a tool kit of mobile devices, the internet, laptops, various modes of transportation, and
multiple payment options when an assigned job is located anywhere across the globe (Burton,
1997).
Globalization brings different countries within proximity of each other regardless of
physical location. Globalization has made the world an open place for trade, cultural exchange,
and social cooperation (Karstedt, 2001). Nonetheless, globalization does not necessarily
equalize the various members of the world community. Globalization might push less developed
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societies closer to the level of their more developed nations in the supply of labor, space, and raw
materials, but it also continues to isolate the share of profits, power, and prosperity to the more
developed nations (Yeates, 2002). Through the lens of globalization, inequality is more
transparent, more visible (Sung, 2004). Immigrants suffer in their native land; therefore, they
migrate to developed nations illegally to perform hard labor for the benefit of the nation’s middle
class citizens (Aguilar-Millan et al., 2008). Due to their illegal status, these immigrants are
prohibited access to the perks associated with citizenship. Under these circumstances,
opportunity for organized crime is created. Organized crime groups recruit migrant workers and
provide them with transportation and lodging.
Predatory organized crime groups aid illegal immigrants by equipping them with false
identity cards, false driver licenses, and false insurance policies (Aguilar-Millan et al., 2008).
Overall, organized crime can prey upon the immigrants’ sense of the deprivation, alienation,
poverty, and injustice associated with being from the Third World (Abadinsky, 2006). Some
organized criminal enterprises adopt a Robin Hood paradigm, using a mischievous logic to
justify the removal of resources from the wealthy for the benefit of the poor (Shaw, 2008). In
other words, citizens from affluent societies are targeted with a clear intent to create a social
disruption in their sphere of influence. Drugs from the criminal groups act as a tool of
redistribution of resources by draining rich countries for the wealth they have harvested,
legitimately and illegitimately, from around the world (Barak, 2001).

Profit
Profit enables the formation and maintenance of an institutional structure and network. In
theory, the potential profit that a predatory criminal enterprise can acquire is unlimited given the
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fact that organized crime groups do not pay international transaction fees, unilaterally set prices
for their goods and services, and have full control over member compensation (Anderson &
Gunnarson, 2003). The high-risk activities performed by members of the organization require
high rewards, that is, high profits. With innovative strategies for gaining money, criminal groups
can keep members through attractive material incentives, train new recruits with advanced
technology, fatally enforce rules, apply penalties effectively, and glorify leaders through
excessive luxuries (Burton, 1997). Operationally, economic flexibility enables predatory
organized crime groups to increase sales, broaden services, expand territories, solidify
monopolies, take up new businesses, or boost their reputation or status in relation to conventional
business, the government, or the general populace (Sung, 2004). Organized crime groups can
specialize in a variety of areas, such as the drug trade, human trafficking, and arms smuggling.
Profit makes some predatory organized criminal enterprises not only embrace globalization; it
also causes these groups to become bold and aggressive in dealing with law enforcement,
business rivals, and disloyal members. The larger-scaled corporate syndicates often have no
hesitation in engaging in personal assassinations, suicide bombings, and militant strategies in
their efforts to grow, process, transport, and distribute drugs (Kraul, Connell, and Lopez 2005).

Cost
While profit is often considered to be the primary goal of predatory crime groups, cost is
understood to be part of the process of gaining income. Organized crime incurs high costs
compared to conventional business ventures. Enticing corrupt officials, paying skilled
operatives, eliciting membership dedication, and supporting leaders in their high-status lifestyles
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means that an organized crime group may have to bear costs several times more than what a
legitimate business has to spend on the delivery of a client-oriented service (Garoupa, 2000). To
sustain the functions of the enterprise, the criminal organization must be able to reduce and soak
up high costs. Operating as an underground enterprise, an organized crime group’s secrecy
depends on the power and protection of an institutional structure (Passas, 1999). Theoretically,
network governance shows traces of its usefulness throughout predatory crime groups’
organizational structure. It is only through an organized network that information can be
gathered with a certain amount of independence, the core of command can be relatively sheltered
from the team of operation, and on-field task execution can be buffered from post-incident
evaluation (Shaw, 2008).
Increasingly, more organized crime enterprises are turning to small-business models to
manage cost, maintain secrecy, and bypass scrutiny from law enforcement, the media, and the
general public (Shaw, 2003). Using familial networks as well as fortuitous social contacts,
organized criminal enterprises can assemble, disassemble, and reassemble groups strategically or
tactically in response to business opportunities, market conditions, and social control reactions
(Zhang & Chin, 2002). The ability to build up and shift human capital is a mark of an
organization in a globalized world. The importance of profit in sustaining predatory organized
criminal enterprises gives insight into the root causes of predatory organized crime.

Causes of Predatory Organized Crime
In contemplating the causes of predatory organized crime, there are forces beyond what
have been other forces besides those that have been discussed. At the root of the debate over the
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causes of human behavior is the social structure verses human nature argument. The argument
contrasts human nature with social structure, human needs with social supply, and human desires
with social constraints (Shaw, 2008). To some thinkers, the innate nature of the human heart
will draw it towards a selfish thirst for survival and maximum consumption. The makeup of a
community and society naturally struggles between the needs of the group verses the needs of
the individual. Often the group’s needs outweigh the individual’s, and therefore society
eventually places limits on goods and services for the benefit of the whole. The limits can refer
to how goods are delivered and to whether goods are rationed by age, gender, race, or
socioeconomic status (Schelling, 1971).
In theory, organized crime is a byproduct of unsatisfied human need and of the limited
resources available to meet that need. When a government fails to meet the demands and needs
of the people, it leaves a void. Criminal networks profit from the gap between universal human
demands and legitimized social supplies of goods and services (Shelley, 1981). The consumer
market for legal and illegal products primarily resides in countries where the average income
base is higher than the poverty standard. In the global community, the gap becomes widened
when people in developed countries can spend minuscule amount of disposable income to
acquire an illicit service or illicit goods from their counterparts in undeveloped countries (Sutton,
2000).
Organized crime exists and thrives simply because some criminal activities, which
include various cross-border transactions, lie beyond individuals and their individual capacities
(Volkov, 2000). Without networks, a single individual, no matter how ambitious, adventurous,
smart, or strong, cannot carry out certain complex criminal tasks all on his or her own (Hamm,

51

2007). Therefore, the entire global community is affected by predatory organized criminal
enterprises in isolated sections of the world due to globalization.

State Political Instability
States become unstable when the central government ceases to provide political
freedoms, civil rights, criminal and civil justice, personal safety, and collective security in an
efficient manner (Sung, 2004). The transparency, equity, and effective delivery of these political
goods legitimize the political system (Blackmon, 2006). Previous research has indicated that the
electoral processes, partitioning of powers, and maintaining of a strong civil society are the best
mechanisms to ensure the achievement of these political goals (Ejiogu, 2001). Failed states are
characterized by heightened levels of crime and hostility, rampant corruption, and an inability of
the rulers to exercise sovereignty without brutality. A failed state can also display an absence of
consent among the governed public, an atrophied public opinion, and a pervasive atmosphere of
uncertainty and instability (Shaw, 2003). Foreign interventions in internal crises, such as
American aid, are also typical among the most serious cases of state failure.
Scholars suggest that the concept of state failure can also be viewed on a quantitative
continuum that ranges from high state functioning to complete state failure, according to the
degree of successful delivery of political goods (Sung, 2004). No evidence indicates that any
state has ever achieved complete control of its jurisdiction, as crime, popular grievances, and
abuse of state authority exist in every society to varying degrees (Skaperdas & Syropoulos,
1995). Extreme forms of state failures often lead to tragedies, such as virulent genocides.
However, there are other failed states that manage to survive amidst perpetual political instability
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as no viable alternatives are available (Ejiogu, 2001). Failures of the state to implement desirable
public policy or government reform are also ubiquitous among advanced constitutional
democracies (Wallis & Dollery, 2001). Perfect state functioning is an ideal stage of political
development that no country has ever achieved (Sung, 2004).
In this study, state political instability is predicted to have a statistical relationship with
predatory crime. State political instability is defined through two criteria: institutional stability
and political stability. The variable of economic failure is also predicted to have a statistical
relationship with predatory crime.

Economic Failure
Economic failure transpires when a state has an acutely inefficient use of human capital.
In other words, economic failure is reflected when there is an exceedingly unjust distribution of
basic goods and services for subsistence (Sung, 2004). Economic failure refers to the
unsuccessful outcomes of a national economy. Such failure differs fundamentally from the
concept of market failure. Market failure focuses on the breakdown of the foundational
mechanisms of a market economy. A market economy measures competition, perfect
information, property rights, etc. Rising national income is neither the only nor the most
essential parameter of a functioning economy, which is best described as an economic system
that distributes material and financial resources in such a way that people can lead lives
according to their needs and interests (United Nations Development Program, 2001). Some
scholars indicate that social factors such as high levels of schooling and good health have been
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found to be powerful propellers of economic growth, which in turn further improve social wellbeing (Barro, 1997).
Financial crisis, high unemployment, poor health, and scarcity of essential goods signal a
severe breakdown of the economic system (Garoupa, 2000). Economic problems reduce people's
material comfort and steal their sense of worth and dignity. The institutional infrastructure of
failing economies is likely to be composed of fragile financial sectors, an inefficient tax system,
and heavy government deficits (Fiorentini & Peltzman, 1995). In some of the more extreme
cases, economic failure includes famine, hyperinflation, and high long-term unemployment,
which if left unresolved can doom a population to permanent destitution (Sung, 2004). When a
distressed economy is not aided with enough timely and adequate welfare spending for an
effective social safety net, a substantial portion of the population may be diverted into the
underworld and the prison system (Lotspeich, 1995; Sutton, 2000). A society weakened by
chronic joblessness and poverty puts its youth at a very high risk of engaging in organized crime
syndicates (Rawlison, 1998). Young recruits will participate in various local and transnational
criminal behaviors, affecting the nation’s economic trajectory for generations (Phongpaichit,
Piriyarangsan, & Treerat, 1998).
An underground economy often emerges amid economic failure, where a shortage of
consumer goods and services is rearranged outside government supervision. Furthermore, an
underground labor market, associated with both the informal and criminal sectors, emerges to
supply employment (Ghersi, 1997; Lotspeich, 1995). Severe forms of an underground economy
constitute a black market, where activities are not only are hidden from fiscal authorities, but
also involve the illicit trade in goods and services that are forbidden by regulatory institutions
(Sung, 2004). Members of the underground economy deliberately seek to avoid official
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detection prior to, during, and after transactions. Therefore, an underground economy
predisposes citizens to illegality by training large sections of the population to participate in
illegal transactions. This training is done by fostering a social morality supportive of activities
outside the bounds of legality (Lotspeich, 1995).
Vice industries and the trafficking of illegal merchandise encroach on economically
depressed regions and countries as alternative strategies of revitalization (Shaw, 2008). Even in
dominant countries, high unemployment and a thriving illicit drug economy are staples of
impoverished inner cities (Foster, 2000; Johnson, Dunlap, & Tourigny, 2000). Some scholars
even suggest that the failure of more prosperous countries creates an underground economy that
feeds into the less prosperous countries (Sung, 2004). In this study, the term “economic failure”
is used to refer to the status of nation-states that meet several criteria. . The economic failure
variable is defined in terms of three elements: the unemployment rate, the strength of the
underground economy, and the level of economic productivity. Coupled with the variable of
state political instability, economic failure is hypothesized to have a statistical relationship with
predatory crime.

Predatory Organized Crime
State failure generates the interest of predatory organized crime lords by raising the
general levels of violence and fear of violence, which in turn increases the popular demand for
security (Lee & Shihadeh, 1998). Security is the product packaged, advertised, and sold to
governments of weak nation-states. When the state capitulates to crime, social discord, and
decaying internal security, personal security convert into a profitable scarce commodity (Sung,
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2004). Failing nation-states slowly shift confidence to predatory crime networks to protect
sustaining markets. In this economical struggle, privatized security and policing flourish,
delivering specialized technology and manpower to the market under the control of regulatory
institutions (Shaw, 2008). However, it is critical that the region avoid a simultaneous collapse of
the economy and of the government’s social functions. If both the government and the economy
fail to sustain a minimum amount of coordination, both safety and security will become an
elusive good operated and produced by predatory criminal organizations (Lawson & Saltmarshe,
2000).
Extortion is a popular predatory activity of criminal influence. Extortion is a popular
activity among both illegal immigrants and the criminal organizations themselves because it
generates opportunity for the lower migrants and provides cash flow to the organization. The
resulting growth in funds allows for the exercise of economic and political influence over a
weakly governed territory (Burton, 1997; Jamieson, 2001). Predatory organized crime groups
exercise a parasitic form of authority that traps businesses and civilians in an extortion-protection
cycle (Shelley, 1999).
Scholars agree that the extortion-protection trap is a paradoxical condition in which a
criminal enterprise is capable of providing effective protection merely due to the threat of
untamed illegal aggression (President's Commission on Organized Crime, 2001). Extortion and
protection rackets are detrimental to lawful business operations because the demand and supply
of the illegal services are dominated by a few criminal units (United States Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 1990). Functional nation-states stifle organized violence through the
regulation of illegal markets for outlawed services (Sung, 2004). On the other hand, failed
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nation-states allow organized violence to leak into both the legal and illegal economic culture
(Shaw, 2008).
The erosion of the economy caused by predatory organized crime does not satisfy
financial growth plans with the opportunity cost that is lost by its existence (Garoupa, 2000). In
other words, the economic erosion caused by POC is not compensated for by other forms of
economic growth. Predatory crime customarily erodes economic production of local markets
over time (Konrad & Skaperdas, 1998). As mentioned earlier, criminal networks lead to a
collapse of governing institutions and security apparatuses, and eventually to the economic
failure of the region (Sung, 2004). Once a state has suffered from a decaying economic and
political environment, predatory criminal organizations assume pseudo-government functions
(Fiorentini & Peltzman, 1995). Predatory crime groups assume the responsibility of guaranteeing
public safety and monopolizing the security market (Shaw, 2003; Cheng, 1997; Gambetta, 1993).
Incompetent but progressing economies will have minimum technology, low-skilled
workforces, and unionization. All three elements of a progressing economy also create a fertile
environment for predatory organized crime (Gambetta & Reuter, 1997). Established networks of
crime morph into professional and political sectors and become the foundation of legitimate
corporations through strategic acts of fear (Cheng, 1997; Reuter, 1983). Violence as a business
tool provides organized crime-related businesses with a competitive advantage in converting
organized violence into wealth through successful integration of action strategies and
commercial decisions (Volkov, 2000).
Predatory groups emerge within the confines of government leadership vacuums, which
allow the groups to control entry into and conditions of operation of determined industries (Sung,
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2004). Despite the expense accrued through the presence of a dominant organized crime
network, a financial and logistical benefit remains for corporations who partner with predatory
groups (Shaw, 2008). Aware of the potential illegal networks, predatory criminal organizations
monopolize niche industries and drive up the costs of services (Anderson, 1995). The imbalance
of market competition, the corruption, and the decaying of financial institutions are the
symptoms of organized crime’s destruction of economic forces (Jamieson, 2001; Kattoulas,
2002; Sun, 1999; Volkov, 2000). Weak governments pose no threat to criminal networks
because the pseudo-governing functions adopted by predatory groups sustain the entire economy
and government (Gambetta & Reuter, 1997). Strategically coordinated state and economic
public policy reforms are critical to addressing predatory crime.
In summary, the literature focused on the analysis of criminal network behaviors that are
predatory in nature. Attention was given to the effects of such predatory crime on weak
governments. Examples of various corporate models adopted by organized crime units were
described, establishing the differing expectations of consumers, the labor force, and the
leadership structure. The impacts of the criminal expectations on economic and political stability
were explored. This has led to the formulation of the three research questions, which ask
whether or to what degree an economy, political environment, and predatory crime groups are
interdependent of or correlated with one another.
Theoretical trends discussed earlier link criminal organizational structures to changes in
global social patterns. Globalization is seen as a critical factor in expanding the business
operation potential of predatory crime groups. The revolutions in communication, travel, and
technology have benefited all forms of business ventures, including criminal ones. Predatory
crime groups have taken advantage of this evolution and have restructured themselves in order to
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maximize profit. Therefore, it is important to view predatory crime in an international and not
just as an aspect of local or national dilemmas. The leaders of the international community do
not have the luxury of ignoring the struggles of weak and failing nation-states. As a result, the
literature helps to identify indicators that describe the struggles of failed nation-states and that
led to the formulation of the regression equations used later in this study. In the methodology
section to follow, the study design and variable definitions are laid out in such a way that is
consistent with previous literature and theoretical trends in this field of study.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research design and method of data
collection. The reason and purpose for this quantitative study will be revealed in reference to its
relevance and theoretical consistency. Chapter Three reviews key predictor and dependent
variables within the appropriate categories of economic failure and political instability. Finally,
this chapter also describes the plan and purpose of regression analysis for addressing the research
questions and hypotheseis.

Study Design
Cross-sectional studies (also known as cross-sectional analyses, transversal studies, or
prevalence studies) form a class of research methods that involve observation of the entirety of a
population, or a representative subset, at one specific point in time. In this case, we are getting a
convenient sample at one specific point in time from all the variables involved in order to
investigate the ecological correlates of predatory crime rates in multiple nations.
The ecological study design allows for the observation of differences between groups
rather than between individuals. The groups in this study are defined by failed nation-states
(multiple group design), and the units of comparison are group-level. There are various
advantages to using an ecological study. First, ecological studies are convenient because they
utilize simple analysis and presentation methods. Also, using this study design permits
simplistic measurement at the population or group level rather than at the individual level, so that
a wider range of exposures can be achieved. Ecological study designs have historically been
widely used in the fields of economics and policy evaluation. Therefore, this study will prove
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useful in studying economic and political patterns across various failing nation-states. The study
design has a framework that permits an analysis of global patterns of nations in various social,
economic, and criminal statistical trends.
This is an exploratory study, meaning that it has no aim of being applied to a bigger
population of countries or years. This is due to the type of sample that was taken, which in this
case was taken for convenience and is by no means a representative sample. The results from this
study should be taken as an invitation to design future studies with representative samples. They
describe only the countries involved in this specific study at the specific time in which the
sample was taken.

Data Source
“Failed” or failing has become key words in international development and security.
Fragility of economic and political apparatuses refers to the issue of dysfunctional states and
societies, which re-emerged in Western thought as one of the major global challenges. Failed
nation-states are said to threaten industrialized nations by providing unprotected territory for
predatory crime groups. They are said to pose a central obstacle to fighting poverty and securing
peace across the globe, thus potentially provoking migration (OECD 2008, p.11). The rise in
relevance of the concept of failing nations in the perception of the Western world engendered the
development of a number of indices attempting to quantify fragility. Below are a few
descriptions of the indices used in quantifying the concept of political stability and economic
failure.
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Failed State Index (FSI)
The data used in this analysis has been collected from a variety of national survey
instruments ranging from the years 2006 to 2010. The data was cleaned, outliers were modified,
and errors were corrected.

The primary data source is the Failed States Index

(http://ffp.statesindex.org/), which is an annual ranking of 177 nations based on their levels of
stability and the pressures they face. The Failed State Index scores should be interpreted with the
understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicates an
improvement, just as a higher score indicates greater instability. The Index is based on The Fund
for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment Software Tool (CAST) analytical platform. Based
on comprehensive social science methodology, data from three primary sources is triangulated
and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Failed States Index. Millions of
documents are analyzed every year, and by applying highly specialized search parameters, scores
are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social, and economic indicators
and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of expert social science research.

Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)
Since 2005, the World Economic Forum has based its competitiveness analysis on the
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), a highly comprehensive index for measuring national
competitiveness. This Index captures the microeconomic and macroeconomic foundations of
national competitiveness. Competitiveness is defined as a set of institutions, policies, and factors
that determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of productivity, in turn, sets the
sustainable level of prosperity that can be earned by an economy. More competitive economies
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tend to be able to produce higher levels of income for their citizens. The productivity level also
determines the rates of return obtained by investments (physical, human, and technological) in an
economy. Because the rates of return are the fundamental drivers of the growth rates of the
economy, a more competitive economy is one that is likely to grow more quickly in the medium
to long run.

Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
The Worldwide Governance Indicators project reports aggregate and individual
governance indicators for 213 economies over the period 1996 to 2010, for six dimensions of
governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The aggregate
indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen, and expert survey
respondents in industrial and developing countries. The individual data sources underlying the
aggregate indicators are drawn from a diverse variety of survey institutes, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations.

Additional data sources include the following. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
produced data on economic conditions of nation-states. The United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA) produced the population in millions. World Economic Forum (WEF) produced the rate
of wastefulness of government spending. World Bank, as well as the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) contributed to the variables used in
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analyzing both the predictor and dependent variables. Each of these sources also shapes the
context of this study by helping to define the nature and characteristics of failed nation-states.

Knowledge about the quality of current indices is still fragmentary and primarily limited
to conceptual issues. Most indices do not provide original data, and therefore it is difficult to
uncover the relevant measurement decisions in detail. An ultimate assessment of the validity and
reliability of fragility indices is complicated because any assessment of measurement quality
needs to be made with reference to the intended application (Adcock and Collier, p. 533). There
is no appropriate reference application in the field of fragility research.
Conceptualization
Most indices refer to state functions conceptually. Frequent concepts across indices on
failed nation-states include: sovereign state, public services, and legitimate political institutions.
There are indices which rates high in conceptualization by creating the most comprehensive
definitions holistic indices. They include the Failed State Index, the Global Competitiveness
Index, and the World Governance Indicators. The holistic indices are policy concentrated. As
their primary objective is identifying states that pose obstacles to promoting development and to
consolidating peace, they are very inclusive and aspire to cover a broad range of deficiencies
which can affect a state and its society. Therefore the indices have to trade political, social,
economic and security concerns against each other. It requires careful theoretical consideration
or substantial empirical evidence to convincingly argue how these nations perform with respect
to each other. This consideration is not provided by the holistic indices. The producers, in an
attempt to build their index in a straightforward and transparent fashion, measure each of their
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attributes with five indicators. However, it is important to theoretically tread carefully as to
avoid conflation, redundancy due to the compact dimensions that are measured with exactly five
indicators.
Measurement
Many indices do not discuss the selection of indicators or even highly transparent indices do not
explain their choice of indicators in detail. The largest concern is in the allegation that indices
are subject to a cultural bias inherent in their indicators which are based on expert survey data.
Even the most respected indices provide little or no documentation on whether indicators
actually measure the correct thing. The selection of indicators is determined by conceptual
reasoning. The choice is severely restricted by data availability. Therefore, many indicators
measure what is actually available in the countries affected. Indices measuring fragility draw
data from a common pool of sources, making it improbable that resulting scores will differ
significantly. Most indices are highly aggregate socio-economic measures which are proxies for
theoretically relevant attributes of failing nation-states.
Aggregation
Most indices apply similar aggregation methods based on the simple addition of equally
weighted attributes. Additive aggregation rules imply that low values on one indicator can be
partly compensated by high values on another indicator (Munck, 2009). Whether compensation
is valid depends on the number of dimensions specified in the index concept. Aggregation can
be justified either by claiming that all selected indicators describe the same unidimensional
phenomenon or by claiming that the indicators are parts combined to form a whole (Munck,
2009). In the measurement process, assumptions about causes and consequences of failed
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nation-states are implicitly introduced. For example, repressive capacity is mostly measured
indirectly by GDP per capita (which leads to higher tax revenue which leads to increase military
force provided directly or indirectly by governments).
Reliable data is important in the process of identifying trends and slowing down the
growth of predatory organized criminal enterprises. Information about the growth, movements,
structures, living conditions, spatial distribution, and natural resources of failed states is vital for
the formulation of relevant policies, for their planning and implementation as well as for their
monitoring and evaluation. For this reason, collection and analysis of data on population and
development-related issues play a fundamental role in policymaking. Generating, analyzing and
disseminating population data is a critical process for the sound and successful development of
policies and programs.

Sample
One of the most comprehensive and well-respected systems for evaluating state
performance is the Failed State Index, which ranks 133 nations and is produced by the Fund for
Peace organization. The Fund for Peace is an independent, nonpartisan research and educational
organization that works to prevent violent conflicts and promote sustainable security. The Index
ranks a variety of nations, ranging from relatively stable to wavering. A nation must qualify as
failing in order to be listed on the Index of failing states, as mentioned in the data source section.
As a result, this list is not inclusive of all countries and nations. Thus, this failed states list is
considered to be purposive sample and not a universe of the sample.

66

Power analysis is the process used in this study for determining the sample size. Power is
the probability of detecting an actual effect when it exists. In other words, it is the probability
that the study will have a significant result if the research hypothesis is accurate. For model 1,
the results reveal that a sample size of 108 is required in order to achieve a nominal power of
0.4000 and an actual power of 0.3541 with an effect size of .056. Therefore, the opportunity of
detecting an actual effect when it exists for model 1 is statistically probable. For model 2, the
results reveal that a sample size of 108 is required in order to achieve a nominal power of .999
and an actual power of 0.999 with an effect size of 0.373. Similarly, the chance of detecting an
actual effect when it exists for model 2 is statistically probable. The final model revealed that a
sample size of 108 achieves a nominal power of .999 and an actual power of .999 with an effect
size of .403. The chance of detecting an actual effect in the final model when it exists is
statistically probable.

Variables
The more critical set of variables was gathered from the Failed State Index (FSI), as
issued by the Fund for Peace. This index characterizes states as failed or failing according to
whether they possess twelve different indicators. The Failed State Index classifies these twelve
indicators into three main categories: Social factors, Economic factors, and Political factors. By
using these twelve indicators, the FSI is able to rate states on a scale from one to ten (ten being
the highest) to identify which nations are having the most trouble in their progress toward
becoming successful states. This study analyzed each failed state indicator to determine whether
each one has a statistical relationship with predatory organized crime. The dependent variable,
Predatory Organized Crime (POC), resembles aspects of white collar crime. In particular,
various dimensions of criminal behavior involve breakdowns in government regulations and
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security. Therefore, the following list of dependent variables is consistent with the literature in
defining POC.


Total score on the Efficiency Legal Framework (lgldspt)



Business Cost of Crime, Reliability of Police Services (policsvc)



Ethical Behavior of Firms (firms)



Control of Corruption (wgicorru)

Table 1 Predictor Variable List
Category
Variables
Underground
Total score on the Economic Decline
Economy
Property Rights
Intellectual Property Protection
Division of Public Funds
Economic
Total score on the Uneven Economic Devel opment
Productivity
GDP
Inflation
Wastefulness of Government Spending
Institutional
Total score on Public Services
Stability
Human Flight
Demographic Pressure
Refugees & IDP's
Political Stability
Total score on Human Rights
Fractionalized Elites
External Intervention, Voice & Accountability
Political Stability & No Violence
Control Variables
Population in millions 2008 (UNFPA)
Government gross debt as a percentage of GDP
2008 (IMF)

Analytical Methods
Initially, structural equation modeling (SEM) was used in an attempt to evaluate a second
order latent factor model of Predatory Organized Crime. Structural equation modeling is a
powerful analytical tool; this tool was selected for four reasons.
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The first is that researchers are becoming more aware of the need to use multiple
observed variables to better understand their area of predatory crime and failed states. Basic
statistical methods only utilize a limited number of variables, which are not capable of dealing
with the sophisticated concepts being developed in this study.

Structural equation modeling permits complex phenomena to be statistically modeled and
tested in a quantitative fashion. However, the data set contains many missing values, and the
data are not normally distributed. These limitations prevent the use of predatory organized crime
as a latent variable or construct. Instead, predatory organized crimes were analyzed by multiple
regression. All the statistical analyses were performed using the software R-Studio Version
0.96.330 (http://www.rstudio.com/).

Multiple Regression
Multiple regression is one of the more important statistical techniques because it helps to
describe the linear association between a dependent variable and a group of predictor variables or
covariates. In this case, this statistical method will help the study to determine how strongly the
set of variables are associated with predatory organized crime. It can determine which variable in
the set of variables (representing political instability and economic failure indicators) is the one
that has the highest association with predatory organized crime, but it will not specifically
determine any causal relationships, as SEM.
Regression makes various assumptions about the data set with little room for violation. It
is suggested that this technique should not be used on small samples with skewed distribution
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). In the present study, regression accommodated the model after
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failing to meet the necessary requirements for confirmatory factor analysis of the constructs in
SEM.
After researching the possible use of truncated regression this methodology did not meet
the criteria for this particular study. For one, truncated regression is used to model dependent
variables for which some of the observations are not included in the analysis of the value of the
dependent variable. In other words there must be clearly defined criteria by which the value of
the dependent variable is clustered at a lower threshold, an upper threshold, or both, while the
value for the independent variables is available.
Currently there are no indices that indicate a clear distinct threshold by which a failed
state is labeled failing. Furthermore, the threshold of whether a country can refrain from failing
is dependent upon factors isolated to that particular region and may not apply to other nations on
the brink of failure. There are only similar attributes of failure but it does not promise uniformity
to the progression of failure in any particular country.
Due to the unique nature of each nation-state and its economic/political environment
there are varying degrees of slight differences which makes it difficult to provide a standard in
which to measure which independent values should be truncated. Therefore, complicates will
occur in selecting what value is used as the truncation value, because it affects the estimation of
the coefficients and standard errors. Nonetheless, there was no theoretical or statistical reason to
run an analysis using truncated regression while maintaining the integrity and fidelity of the
study. Therefore, standard multiple regression was selected as the appropriate analytical tool.
In standard multiple regression, all the independent variables are entered into the
statistical equation simultaneously. The results of a multiple regression analysis indicate the total
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proportion of criterion variance explained by all predictors and the relative importance of each
predictor. Each standardized regression estimate indicates the net association of a predictor
variable when the effects of other predictors are simultaneously and statistically controlled on a
dependent variable. We will look at the direction of the relationship between variables by
reviewing the regression coefficient associated with each variable. There are two kinds of
regression coefficients: B (unstandardized) and beta standardized. The B weight associated with
each variable is given in terms of units of each variable. The beta uses a standard unit that is the
same for all variables in the equation. Beta weights are useful because you can compare two
variables that are measured in different units. The squared multiple correlation coefficient (Rsquare value) indicates the proportion of the dependent variable’s variance explained by all
predictors included.

Dependent Variable
Because there are multiple indicators of predatory crimes observed at the national level,
the construction of an aggregated and weighted index of predatory organized crime is necessary.
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is used. PCA is a technique used to reduce the
dimensionality of variables collected from the same subject, or nation-state in this case, and
extracting the smallest number of components that explains the overall variation. A principal
component was defined as a linear combination of optimally weighted observed variables
(Hatcher & Stepanski, 1994). Linear combination refers to the fact that scores on a component
are created by adding together scores on the observed variables being analyzed (Kaiser, 1960).
The term “optimally weighted” refers to the fact that the observed variables are weighted in such
a way that the resulting components account for maximal amount of variance in the data set
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(Cattell, 1966). Thus, we took the following variables from the theoretical construct of
Predatory Crime:


Total score on the Efficiency Legal Framework (lgldspt)



Business cost of Crime, Reliability of Police Services (policsvc)



Ethical Behavior of Firms (firms)



Control of Corruption (wgicorru)

Having taken these variables, we obtained a linear combination that will define the measure for
predatory organized crime.

Independent Variables
A total of seventeen variables were evaluated as predictor variables for the response.
Because these seventeen variables come from two main categories (economy and politics), a
separate regression analysis was done for each, including the variable selection process. Then,
with the final variables from each model, a final model was fitted. Control variables were then
included in the three models.
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Table 2 Models 1 & 2 Key Variables
Category
Variables
Economy
Total score on the Economic Decline
(Model 1)
Property Rights
Intellectual Property Protection
Division of Public Funds
Total score on Uneven Economic Development
GDP
Inflation
Wastefulness of Government Spending
Politics
Total score on Public Services
(Model 2)
Human Flight
Demographic Pressure
Refugees & IDPs
Total score on Human Rights
Fractionalized Elites
External Intervention
Voice & Accountability
Political Stability & No Violence
Control Variables
Population in millions 2008 (UNFPA)
Government gross debt as a percentage of GDP 2008
(IMF)

Relative Importance of Predictor Variables
In order to do the variable selection process, the multi-collinearity was analyzed first, and
the variables with high correlation with other predictors were separated from the model, using
the indicators explained in the next section. After this, the regression assumptions were
evaluated, to finally choose the variables that were significant at a 0.05 level.

Multiple Regression Assumptions
Researchers using multiple regression make certain major assumptions that need to be
addressed when conducting this analysis. One assumption concerning the error terms and the Y
values is that they are normally distributed but remain unrelated. A second assumption is that
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there is constant variance across the error terms and Y values. Third, it is assumed that the error
terms and the Y values are independent of each other and are unrelated. It is also assumed that
each X is a fixed variable with the predictor values being constants that would not vary with a
different sample. Finally, it is assumed that the predictor variables must be uncorrelated with
each other. This assumption is also called multi-collinearity. The number of observations must
exceed the number of predictor variables. Green suggested specific minimum ratios of
observations to predictors (1991); however, sometimes meeting this assumption is difficult. The
following assumptions will now be discussed: sample size, multi-collinearity, outliers, and
normality.

Sample Size
Scholars vary on acceptable guidelines concerning the number of cases required for
multiple regression. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) suggested a formula for calculating sample
size requirements, taking into account the number of independent variables that will be utilized:
N > 50 + 8m.

Multi-collinearity
Multi-collinearity occurs when the independent variables are highly correlated with an r
of .9 or higher. Singularity exists when one independent variable is actually a combination of
another independent variable. Multiple regression does not accept singularity or multicollinearity because these phenomena do not produce an acceptable regression model. A
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statistics to quantify the severity of multi-collinearity is called variance inflation factor, and for
this study, a threshold of 10 is used.

Outliers
Scores that are either too high or very low create a disturbance in the multiple regression
statistical technique. Multiple regression is fairly sensitive to outliers. Outliers are those with
standardized residual values above roughly 3.3 or less than -3.3.

Normality
The concept of normality refers to the distribution of scores and the pattern of the
underlying relationship between the variables. Identifying and reviewing the residuals can assist
in testing this assumption. Residuals are the differences between the obtained and predicted
dependent variable scores. The normality residuals are normally distributed about the predicted
dependent variable. The linearity residuals have a straight-line relationship with predicted
dependent variable scores. In terms of homoscedasticity, the variance of the residuals about
predicted dependent variable scores should be the same for all predicted scores.
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CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
In this chapter the results of the data are presented. The data were processed in response
to the research questions posed in Chapter One. Three fundamental questions drove the selection
of data and the data analysis.
The first question asks whether political instability was more influential in explaining the
variability of Predatory Organized Crime (POC). The second question asks whether Political
Instability explains the variation in POC in multiple nations. The third question asks whether
Economic Failure explains the variation in POC in multiple nations. These questions were
answered. The findings presented in this chapter demonstrate the potential for merging theory
and practice in identifying POC criminal elements.

Descriptive Statistical Analysis
The first result was the index to measure the response variable. As explained in the
previous section, a PCA was calculated with the following linear combination as a result. The
model consisted of twenty variables with 133 observations. Ten variables had no missing data,
while the other ten had, a maximum, five missing values, and at the least, one missing value.
Histograms are included to help give clarity to the nature of the data set used in this study. The
index explains roughly 90 percent of the variation of the group of variables:
Response = 0.487*lgldspt+0.499* policsvc+0.520* firms+0.495* wgicorru
(4.1)
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Figure 1 Descriptive statistics of the response variable
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Although the index does not have a normal shape, it is clearly evident that the errors in
the model are normal after all. Also, the response has a high correlation with most of the
predictors, except for the control variables, as can be seen in the next section. For the final
model, a Shapiro-Wilk normality test was conducted with W=0.9856 and a p-value equal to
0.2282. Also, the Durbin Watson test for autocorrelation resulted in a W statistic of 1.9857 and a
p-value of 0.958. The distribution of residuals for the final model satisfies the normality
assumption for a regression analysis.
An assessment of the linear model assumptions was conducted using the global test on
four degrees of freedom. A level of significance of 0.05 was accepted. As a result, the global
stat was acceptable with a p-value of 0.5648, skewness p-value of 0.1659, Kurtosis p-value of
0.9995, and a heteroscedasticity p-value of 0.4247.

All assumptions were acceptable for the

final regression model used.
The final regression model had a residual standard error of 0.6781 on 113 degrees of
freedom with multiple R-squared of 0.8882. The adjusted R-squared resulted in an acceptable
0.8813 with an F-statistic of 128.3 on 7 and 113 degrees of freedom with a p-value less than
2.2e-16.
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From the other nineteen variables that were used, seventeen were predictor variables and
two were controls. The following table presents descriptive statistics for the twenty variables:
Economic Failure Model 1:

Figure 2 Descriptive statistics of the Economic predictor variables
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Political Stability Model 2

Figure 3 Descriptive statistics of the political instability predictor variables

Important highlights on the histograms are the presence of outliers in the variables of
GDP, inflation, population and gross debt. Also, it is important to note the lack of normality in
most of the variables. These outliers represent intrinsic characteristics of the countries under
study, and therefore cannot be removed. For Model 1, the predictor variables have a minimum
of -0.9996, a median of 0.0114, and a maximum of 1.8431. For Model 2, the predictor variables
have a minimum of -2.8772, a median of 0.0575, and a maximum of 2.4371. For the final
model, the predictor variables have a minimum of -2.9951, a median of 0.0536, and a maximum
of 2.4917.
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Assumptions
Sample Size
The final model, Model 3, consisted of seven independent variables. In the equation, m
equals the number of independent variables. Therefore, N > 50 + 8(7) = 106. Thus, at least 106
samples are needed in order to produce a result that is generalizable to other samples. Although
in this study we have more than 106 samples (133), the sample is not random. Thus, we have to
be very cautious about making inferences to other samples, and must confine ourselves to a
simple description of the data.
Multi-collinearity
As mentioned before, the multi-collinearity test was used to select the variables. For the
final model, we have the following values for the VIF:
Table 3 Final Model VIF Values
Variable

VIF

Gdp
Govspnd
fsihumflt
fsirefuge
Fsifactn
grosdebt08
pop08

3.29
4.04
3.64
2.87
4.38
1.18
1.05

None of these exceeded the threshold established for this study.
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Outliers
In this case, a couple of outliers were present, as evident in the following plot. Nevertheless,
these outliers did not affect the leverage or the normality test, so they stayed in the model. In the
QQ plots below, it is clear that a linear and normal relationship is proven.

Figure 4 QQ Plot to test for normality and for any outliers in the data set
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Normality
For this model, a Shapiro Test was performed for the residuals, with the conclusion that
there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of normality (p= 0.2282). Also, a score test for
non-constant variance was calculated, with the same positive result. There was no evidence to
reject the null hypothesis of constant variance for the residuals (p = 0.4286).

Correlation Analysis
In the following plots, red colors represent negative correlation and blue tones represent
positive correlation. Note that most of the variables are highly correlated, with the exception of
the control variables in both cases and inflation for Model 2.

Political Model

Economic Model

Figure 5 Correlation matrix of both economic and political models of predictor variables
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Due to this highly correlated scenario, we will select variables using the multicollineartity test before starting with the variable selection procedure. QQ plots were displayed
earlier to give evidence of the direction of the correlations that exist in this section.

Regression Analysis:
Economic Failure - Model 1
Model 1 started with all the variables accounted by the politics category:
orgcri2= (β₀) + (β₁) fsiuneven + (β₂) gdp + (β₃) infltn + (β₄) govspnd + (β₅) fsiecodrop + (β₆)
prptyrts + (β₇) intprpty + (β₈) pubfund + (β₉) pop08 + (β₁₀) grosdebt08 + εᵢ
(4.2)



The VIF was calculated and then the following variables were eliminated because they
had VIF > 10:
o Prptyrts, intprpty.



After this, a stepwise backward procedure was implemented, and the following variables
were eliminated because of their lack of importance (using a significance level of 0.05):
o fsiecodrop.



Although the control variables were not significant, they were kept in the model because
the goal was not to see their correlation with the response; rather, the goal was to see the
correlation of the other predictors controlling for population and gross debt.
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Final Economic Model 1 was the following:
o orgcri2= (2.812e-01) + (-9.040e-02) fsiuneven + (4.513e-03) gdp + (9.151e-07)
infltn + (1.110e-01) govspnd + (6.294e-01) pubfund + (1.264e-04) pop08 + (8.208e-04) grosdebt08 + εᵢ


(4.3)

Model 1 had an adjusted R-square of 0.9106, and the model was significant; however, not all the
assumptions were fulfilled (problems with normality in the residuals).
Political Stability - Model 2
Model 2 started with all the variables accounted by the political category:
orgcri2= β₀ + (β₁) fsipubsrv + (β₂) fsihumflt + (β₃) fsidemog + (β₄) fsirefuge + (β₅) fsiright +
(β₆) fsifactn + (β₇) fsiexter +(β₈) wgivoice + (β₉) wgipolst+ (β₁₀) pop08+ (β₁₁) grosdebt08 + εᵢ

(4.4)


The VIF was calculated and then the following variables were eliminated since they had
VIF > 10:
o Fsipubsrv, fsidemog, fsiright.



After this, a stepwise backward procedure was implemented, and the following variables
were eliminated due to their lack of importance in the model (using a significance level
of 0.05):
o Wgivoice, fsiexter.
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Although the control variables were not significant, they were kept in the model since the
goal was not to see their correlation with the response, but to see the correlation of the
other predictors controlling for population and gross debt.



Final Model 2 was the following:
o orgcri2= (9.0734) + (-0.3605) fsihumflt + (0.2943) fsirefuge + (-0.1346) fsifactn
+ (0.7867) wgipolst + (0.0009) pop08 + (0.0043) grosdebt08 + εᵢ
(4.5)



Model 2 had an adjusted R-square of 0.6979, and the model was significant. All the
assumptions were fulfilled.

Final Model 3
Model 3 started with all the variables that were significant in the final Models 1 and 2, plus
control variables:
orgcri2= (β₀) + (β₁) fsiuneven + (β₂) gdp + (β₃) infltn + (β₄) govspnd + (β₅) pubfund + (β₆)
fsihumflt + (β₇) fsirefuge + (β₈) fsifactn + (β₉) wgipolst + (β₁₀) grosdebt08 + (β₁₁) pop08 + εᵢ

(4.6)


The VIF was calculated and no variables with VIF > 10 were found.



After this, a stepwise backward procedure was implemented, and the following variables
were eliminated because of their lack of importance (using a significance level of 0.05):
o fsiuneven, infltn, pubfund, wgipolst.
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Although the control variables were not significant, they were kept in the model since the
goal was not to see their correlation with the response, but to see the correlation of the
other predictors controlling for population and gross debt.



Final Model 3 was the following:
o orgcri2= (4.1760) + (0.0228) gdp + (1.0729) govspnd + (-0.2118) fsihumflt +
(0.0911) fsirefuge + (-0.2485) fsifactn + (0.0032) pop08 + (0.0005) grosdebt08
+ εᵢ
o



(4.7)

Model 3 had an adjusted R-square of 0.883, and the model was significant. All the
assumptions were fulfilled; details about the assumptions are in the following section.

The final model is presented as follows:
Yᵢ = β₀ + β₁Xᵢ + β₂Xᵢ + β₃Xᵢ + β₄Xᵢ + β₅Xᵢ + β₆Xᵢ + β7Xᵢ7 + Ɛᵢ
(Predatory Org Crime)ᵢ = β₀ + β₁(GDP)ᵢ + β₂(Wastefulness of Government Spending)ᵢ + β₃(
Human Flight )ᵢ + β₄( Refugees & IDP's )ᵢ + β5(Fractionalized Elites)ᵢ + β6(Population)ᵢ +
β7(Govt Gross Debt)ᵢ + Ɛᵢ
( 4.8)

A model within multiple regression cannot be displayed by a two-dimensional line, so a
multidimensional plane is needed. The multiple regression models in this study are examples of
an additive model where all the explained variation in Predatory Organized Crime (Y) is due to
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the additive effects of the predictor variables. This model does not include interactions or
multiplicative effects between the predictor variables.
Betas, such as, β₁, β₂, β₃, etc. are regression coefficients and are also known as population
parameters. Beta zero, β₀, is the true mean value of the measure of predatory organized crime
when each predictor variable equals zero.
Beta 1, β₁, is the regression coefficient for Predatory Organized Crime (Y) on GDP (X₁)
holding the other predictor variables X₂, X₃, X₄, X₅, X₆ and X7 constant. Beta 2, β₂, is the
regression coefficient for Predatory Organized Crime (Y) on Wastefulness of Government
Spending (X)₂ holding the other predictor variables X₁, X₃, X₄, X₅, X₆ and X7 constant. Beta 3,
β₃, is the regression coefficient for Predatory Organized Crime (Y) on Human Flight (X₃)
holding the other predictor variables X₁, X₂, X₄, X₅, X₆ and X7 constant. Beta 4, β₄, is the
regression coefficient for Predatory Organized Crime (Y) on Refugees & IDP's (X₄) holding the
other predictor variables X₁, X₂, X₃, X₅, X₆ and X7 constant. Beta 5, β₅, is the regression
coefficient for Predatory Organized Crime (Y) on Fractionalized Elites (X₅) holding the other
predictor variables X₁, X₂, X₃, X₄, X₆ and X7 constant.
Beta 6 and Beta 7, β6 and β7, are not interpretable in this case because they are only being
used as control variables. Ɛᵢ is an unexplained error affiliated with the measure of Predatory
Organized Crime not explained by the model.
The slope parameters are labeled partial regression coefficients because they indicate the
change in Y per unit change in a particular X, holding the other predictor variables constant. A
simple regression would not have been beneficial for this study because it would measure the
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change in Y per standard unit of one predictor variable while ignoring the influence of other
predictors. Multiple regression models allow for an assessment of the relationship between the
response variable and each of the predictors, adjusting for the other predictors.
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Table 4 Final Multiple Regression Output
Unstandardized Stand.
Coefficients

B

Intercept

8.88
<0.001 3.2445 5.1076
4.1760
0.0228 0.0052 0.2422 4.55
<0.001 0.0129 0.0327
1.0729 0.0841 0.4658 12.76 <0.001 0.9063 1.2395

GDP
Wastefulness
of
Government
Spending
Human Flight

Std.
Beta
Error
0.4702

t

Sig.

95.0%
Confidence
Lower Upper

0.0530 -3.99 0.0011
0.2118
0.2277
Refugees
0.0911
0.1034 2.09
0.039
0.0437
Fractionalized 0.0415 -5.99 <0.001
Elites
0.2485
0.3099
Population in 0.0032 0.0022 0.0478 1.46
0.1465
Millions
Govt Gross
0.0005
0.0389 1.22
0.2232
Debt
0.0003
Table 4 a. Dependent Variable: Predatory_Organized_Crime,
Multiple R-squared: 0.888, Adjusted R-squared: 0.881

0.3168 0.1069
0.0046 0.1777
0.3306
0.0011
0.0003

0.1663
0.0075
0.0012

The last step in this study was to determine which of the variables in the final model are
more strongly associated with the dependent variable. To compare the different variables, it is
critical to use the standardized coefficients and not the unstandardized coefficients. Standardized
coefficient means that the values for each of the different variables have been changed to the
same scale so that a comparison can occur. The unstandardized coefficient values listed as B are
used for constructing a regression equation. The dependent variable is Predatory Organized
Crime. The independent variables include GDP, wastefulness of government spending, human
flight, refugees, fractionalized elites, and finally population and gross debt as control variables.
This study was particularly designed to enable the comparison of the association of each
independent variable; therefore, the standardized beta values were used. The variables with the
90

largest beta values, regardless of negative signs, were of interest. In this study, the largest beta
coefficient is 0.4658, which is for Wastefulness of Government Spending (WGS). This means
that the WGS variable has the strongest association with the dependent variable, when the
variance explained by all other variables in the model is controlled for. The beta for
Fractionalized Elites makes the next largest contribution at -0.3099.
For each of the variables, the value in the column marked Sig was evaluated. The Sig.
value determines whether the variable is making a statistically significant, unique contribution to
the equation. The Sig. value is dependent upon which variables are included in the equation and
on how much overlap exists among the independent variables. If the Sig. value is less than .05,
then the variable is making a significant unique contribution to the prediction of the dependent
variable. If greater than .05, then the variable is not making a significant unique contribution to
the description of Predatory Organized Crime (dependent). In this case, all variables in the final
model were statistically significant (p<0.05), except for the control variables (and hence, it is not
necessary to describe them as significant).
It is important to note that the R^2 = 0.888, and the corrected version of the same statistic
is equal to 0.881. This means that the proportion of the response variable variance explained by
all predictors, corrected by the number of covariates, is 0.881. Expressed as a percentage, this
means that our model explains 88.1 percent of the variance in Predatory Organized Crime. This
is quite a respectable result even in comparison with reports in top journals. This gives us a
good measure of how well the model fits; it provides statistically relevant results.
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Discussion
Hypotheses Testing
This study is comprised of five different hypotheses that have to do with the association
between the response variable of Predatory Organized Crime- and each of the covariates. In the
following paragraphs, each hypothesis will be discussed.
According to the null hypothesis, there is not enough evidence to say that the association
between Predatory Organized Crime (Y) and GDP (X₁), holding the other predictor variables
constant, is different from zero.
vs
There is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis (p<0.001). The association between
Predatory Organized Crime (Y) and GDP (X1), holding the other predictor variables constant, is
positive and statistically significant.
A unit of change in the standardized variable GDP is associated with an increase of
0.2422 units in the standardized response variable. The variable GDP per capita is gross
domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. This positive correlation
is consistent with the research, which states that POC ignites economic growth through cheap
labor, illegal business practices, and underground markets. According to network governance
theory, the loosely connected partnerships will shift and change based on the increased amount
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of income produced through each network. The earned money is circulated through the poor
nation-state, flowing through pseudo governments and third party agencies. Deliberate and
efficient partnerships sustain cash flow throughout the crippled economy. Therefore, as GDP
increases in failed nation-states, this may be a result of the financial contributions of POCsupported corporations. However, the increase in GDP does not reflect the distribution of
benefits from increased cash from POC and government agencies to poor citizens.
According to the null hypothesis, the association between Predatory Organized Crime (Y)
and Wastefulness of Government Spending (X2), holding the other predictor variables constant,
is different from zero.
vs
There is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis (p<0.001). The association between
Predatory Organized Crime (Y) and Wastefulness of Government Spending (X2), holding the
other predictor variables constant, is positive and statistically significant.
A unit of change in the standardized variable Wastefulness of Government Spending is
associated with an increase of 0.4658 units in the standardized response variable. This positive
correlation is consistent with the research that states that as a government's ability to control
spending declines, the effectiveness of that government to govern declines. It is in this
environment that POC groups thrive due to the basic foundations that are present for illegal
business. Some of the basic foundations include a vulnerable government that lacks financial
control, a high population of poor citizens, and the existence of human/natural resources.
Therefore, as this variable increases, the elements that foster POC increase. Government
partnerships are created through networks, as described in network governance theory, to gain
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access to funds extracted from the broken economy. The inherent problem in the network of
POC partners is the self-interestedness of its outcome objectives. Very little effort is directed
toward benefiting the existing populations within the region. All financial benefits are directed
towards POCs networks and to other foreign partnerships loosely connected to the criminal
network.
According to the null hypothesis, the association between Predatory Organized Crime (Y)
and Human Flight (X3), holding the other predictor variables constant, is different from zero.
vs
There is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis (p=0.0011). The association between
Predatory Organized Crime (Y) and Human Flight (X3), holding the other predictor variables
constant, is negative and statistically significant.
A unit of change in the standardized variable Human Flight is associated with decrease of
0.2277 units in the standardized response variable. Theoretically, this negative correlation is
consistent with the majority of research that states that POC creates an administrative foundation
from the poor population within the failed nation state. POC provides job security in the absence
of a strong local government. Therefore, an increase in human flight negatively affects the profit
margins of POC. Network governance theory argues that there must be a consistent partnership
established in order to create secure networks for business and jobs. A constant flow of
workforce population may affect the consistency needed for a positive business relationship.
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According to the null hypothesis, the association between Predatory Organized Crime (Y)
and Refugees and IDP’s (X4), holding the other predictor variables constant, is different from
zero.
vs
There is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis (p=0.039). The association between
Predatory Organized Crime (Y) and Refugees & IDP's (X4), holding the other predictor variables
constant, is positive and statistically significant.
A unit of change in the standardized variable Refugees & IDPs is associated with an
increase of 0.1034 units in the standardized response variable. Theoretically, this positive
correlation is consistent with the majority of research that states that POC capitalizes on the
free/low cost labor of refugees. So as the number of refugees increases, the POC is more likely to
strengthen its presence in that region. Network governance theory suggests that constant
relationships are needed for strong networks and partnerships. A reliable workforce (refugees)
permits POC to operate systematically through trusted networks of collaborators.
According to the null hypothesis, the association between Predatory Organized Crime (Y)
and Fractionalized Elites (X5), holding the other predictor variables constant, is different from
zero.
vs
There is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis (p=0.005). The association between
Predatory Organized Crime (Y) and Fractionalized Elites (X5), holding the other predictor
variables constant, is negative and statistically significant.
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A unit of change in the standardized variable Fractionalized Elites is associated with a
decrease of 0.3099 units in the standardized response variable. The variable Fractionalized Elites
measures the rate by which ruling elites and state institutions divide along group lines. This
negative correlation is consistent with the research, which states that the rise of Factionalized
Elites is one of the leading causes of governmental collapse. This particular indicator leads to a
functional societal dissolving and eventual failure of the state. An established strong government
can be financially burdensome for ruling elites; therefore, they eliminate non-producing
partnerships. The fall of a government is consistent with the elimination of a partnership,
leaving more income for POCs and ruling elites. However, POCs gradually monopolize markets
by eliminating competition, including factionalized elites. Over time, the voices of the elites are
silenced through the threat of POC violence.

Discussion
In the analysis, this study was able to successfully obtain a model that contains
statistically significant predictor variables of both political instability and economic failure. The
intentions of the study were to avoid modifications of both models 1 and 2 in order to maintain
consistency in meaning or interpretation of political instability and economic failure. However,
modifications were statistically necessary. A separate regression analysis was completed for
each, including the variable selection process. At last, with the final variables from each model, a
final model was fitted.
The PCA procedure was able to achieve an explanation of roughly 90% of the variation
of the group of variables for the dependent variable. Also, most of the predictor variables
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selected was highly correlated, with the exception of the control variables causing multicollinearity. Out of the nine variables used in the Economic Failure model 1, five variables were
removed because of their lack of importance. This extraction of variables procedure prevents
further comparisons between Models 1 and 2. Nonetheless, the remaining variables in Model 1
included the following: Human Flight, Fractionalized Elite, and Economic Failure had an
adjusted R-square of 0.6979 and the model was significant. The statistical significance of Model
1 supports the results of the research question that asks whether economic failure explains any
variation of predatory organized crime. Out of the eight variables used in the Political Instability
model 2, there were three removed due to their lack of importance. The remaining variables
include the following: GDP, Inflation, Wasteful Government Spending, Division of Public
Funds, and the Total score on the Uneven Economic Development. Model 2 had an adjusted Rsquare of 0.9106, and the model was significant. The statistical significance of Model 2 supports
the results of the research question that asks whether political stability explains any variation of
predatory organized crime.
The final model was a combination of all significant variables from Models 1 and 2. In
comparing the association of each independent variable, the standardized beta values were
evaluated. The variables with the largest beta values, regardless of negative signs, were of
interest. In this study, the largest beta coefficient is 0.4658, which is for Wastefulness of
Government Spending. This means that this variable has the strongest association with the
dependent variable when the variance explained by all other variables in the model is controlled
for. The original definition of economic and political models consists of a starting set of
variables, which were listed in the previous chapter. Variables were removed due to VIF scores.
Therefore, without the original variables, the defined economic and political models cannot be
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compared and contrasted. The study was unsuccessful in meeting comparison criteria between
Models 1 and 2. No argument can be used to state that Economic Failure is more or less
influential in explaining the variability of Predatory Organized Crime. However, the Economic
Failure variables account for a larger beta coefficient collectively than the political instability
variables. In other words, the Economic Failure variables account for more variance collectively
than the Political Instability variables. Therefore, policy solutions to address predatory crime
may exist in factors that are economically influenced. The beta for Fractionalized Elites makes
the next largest contribution, at -0.3099. The Fractionalized Elite variable comes for the Political
Instability variable and can be used to confirm that Political Instability does explain some
percent of the variation of Predatory Organized Crime in multiple nations. All Political
Instability variables included in the final model collectively explain some variation of Predatory
Organized Crime.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Conclusion
The final regression model successfully identified the indicators of predatory crime that
theoretically is associated with economic failure and political stability. However, the study did
not result in a definitive connection between economic failure and political stability in relation to
predatory organized crime. Further research will seek to either increase the sample size for the
use of SEM or look to theoretically add indicators to the definition of economic failure and
political stability so that a comparative analysis can occur.
Network governance theory keyed in on relational contracting, structural embeddings and
globalization. Variables included in the final model supports the network governance theory as
an explanation of predatory organized crime. First, fractionalized elite supports the use of social
mechanism by predatory crime groups to create structural embeddedness that provides civil
participants in illegal business ventures. As elites partake in politically isolationist activities the
remaining classes look to predatory crime groups as social pillars. Second, wastefulness of
government spending acknowledges the role network governance play in predatory crime
networks. Network governance indicates relational contracting as vital to economic growth in a
global world. Wastefulness of government spending lead to a weaken government who contracts
with predatory crime groups for social services. Third, human flight and refugees indicate the
relevance of globalization theories where populations understand and is aware of the proximity
of assistance in neighboring countries. It is through the consistency of theoretical principles that
each research question and hypothesis was successfully answered.
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The first research question asks whether Political Instability was more influential than
Economic Failure in explaining the variability of Predatory Organized Crime. Due to violations
of VIF levels and insignificant beta scores variables in both models were removed and therefore
prevented further comparison of political instability and economic failure. Nonetheless, this
study was successful in indentifying that Economic Failure had a statistically significant
influence in explaining the variability of Predatory Organized Crime. In explaining the
variation, the variable wasteful government spending provided the largest contribution to that
variation in POC in the final model. The study was unsuccessful in meeting comparison criteria
between models 1 and 2. Therefore, no argument can be used to state that Economic Failure is
more or less influential in explaining the variability of Predatory Organized Crime. Nonetheless,
the economic variables account for more variance collectively than the political instability
variables.
The second question asks whether Political Instability explain the variation in predatory
organized crimes in multiple nations. This study was successful in identifying Political
Instability as explaining some variation in Predatory Organized Crime. The political instability
model provided a statistically significant association with predatory organized crime. In
explaining the variation, the variable factionalized elites produced the largest percentage to
explain the POC in the final model.
The third question asks whether Economic Failure explains the variation in Predatory
organized crimes in multiple nations. This study was again successful in identifying Economic
Failure as explaining some variation in Predatory Organized Crime. The economic failure model
provided a statistically significant association with predatory organized crime. Also, all the
research questions were answered, coupled with rejecting the entire null hypothesis.
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The study empirically produced evidence to support a relationship between predatory
organized crime and the rate of refugees. Theoretically this positive correlation is consistent with
the majority of research that states that POC (Predatory Organized Crime) capitalizes on free/low
cost labor of refugees. So as the number of refugees increases, the more likely the POC will
strengthen its presence in that region. The fundamental need of refugees is economic in nature
and it supports the view that the economic failure in the failing nations is an area that needs great
focus.
Empirical evidence supported a relationship between predatory organized crime and the
rate in the number of people who flee to neighboring countries. Theoretically, this negative
correlation is consistent with the majority of research that states that POC creates an
administrative foundation from the poor population within the failed nation state. Therefore,
if the number of people taking flight to a neighboring nation the influence of the nation-state will
decrease due to a decline work force. The rate of change in the work force in failing nations is
also an economic concern.
The study empirically revealed evidence to support a relationship between predatory
organized crime and the rate of external intervention. Theoretically this negative correlation is
consistent with the majority of research that states that a POC group operates best in isolation.
The term isolation refers to POC avoidance of any foreign power policing intervention efforts in
the local political or economic affairs. POC will only accept external partners in business
transactions but not as foreign aid support for the failed nation-state in which it
resides. Therefore, as external intervention increases the influential presence of POC groups in
regions decrease. Foreign policing intervention efforts are seen as a threat to growth in profit
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margins by POCs. Therefore, this external intervention is also an economic related issue at its
roots.

Empirical evidence supported a relationship between predatory organized crime and the
rate of voice and accountability measures. The variable Voice and Accountability measures
perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. This
positive correlation is consistent with the research, which states that POC act as a parasite on
existing government, causing them to become weak. As a result the POC groups become the
provider of semi-government social services. This shift causes the population to reject the
legitimate local government and accepts the role of the POC in society. Therefore, as the
standardized variable increases in displeasure, POC gathers more support from the failed nationstate. The cost of labor for predatory crime groups can be indirectly identified through the areas
of social services. POC groups have to assume control of social services as a pseudo pillar of the
local weak government. The local environment becomes politically and economically dependent
upon the operations of the POC’s business.

The study ascertained empirical evidence to support a relationship between POC and the
rate of political stability. The variable Political Stability and No Violence measures perceptions
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. This positive correlation is
consistent with the research, which state the POC starts as a contractual partner with the local
government as a security armed force. Once the POC stabilizes the levels of violence it then
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assumes control of both the government and the perceptions of the poor populations (workforce).
Therefore, as stability increases so does the influence of POC groups in the region.
The study found empirical evidence to support a relationship between predatory
organized crime and the rate GDP. This positive correlation is consistent with the research,
which states that POC ignite economic growth through cheap labor, illegal business practices,
and through underground market. This money is circulated through the poor nation-state.
Therefore, as GDP increases in failed nation-states this may be a reflection of the financial
contribution of POC supported corporations.
Empirical evidence supports a relationship between predatory organized crime and the
rate of government spending. This positive correlation is consistent with the research that states
that as a government's ability to control spending declines, the effectiveness of that government
to govern declines. It is in this environment that POC groups gravitate towards due to the basic
foundations that are present for illegal business. Some of the basic foundations include a
vulnerable government that lacks financial/spending control, a high poor population, and the
existence of human/natural resources. Therefore, as this variable increases the elements for the
foundation of POC increases. The common theme throughout the findings is primarily economic
in nature and legislatively this complex issue should start with the economic foundation of failed
nation-states.

Implications
The findings in this study align with historical evidence which traces back to the events
of the 1980's where banks began to lavish loans on Third World governments, many of them
(Third World governments) led by crime lords. Predatory crime group leaders and corrupted
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governments enriched themselves on the banks' money, but it was and currently is, the countries'
poor who is required to pay the money back. The economy of that particular nation state suffers
due to corruption and ineffective legislation. Poor citizens of failed or failing nation states suffer
under draconian policies adjusted to and structurally imposed by the International Monetary
Fund. The 'Structural Adjustment Policies' is the process by which countries begin to fail,
governments weaken, and predatory crime groups grow.
There are obligations to be completed by any failed country who have been a victim of
corrupted leaders who accepted and spent money loaned to them from the IMF and the World
Bank. Leaders of failed nations are in need of money because their economy is dissolved.
Therefore, only the benefits of receiving such financial gifts are contemplated while ignoring the
repercussions. Nation States who are failing and receive money must enact at least six policies
due to the demands of the IMF.
The first of the six laws is the promotion of export-oriented production. Failed nation
states are encouraged to move land from basic food crops towards export-oriented products.
Products of this nature may include: broccoli, shrimp, coffee, corn, and cut flowers. Each
product mentioned is ecologically damaging. For example, cash crops often require an increased
utilization of pesticides, herbicides, and chemical fertilizers that harm the environment. Also,
the poor normally cannot purchase food and live in a malnutrition community due to food price
increases. Predatory crime groups use this to their advance to acquire cheap labor, legitimate
funding sources, and to hide criminal activity. Free trade zones are another element of this
policy where work is outsourced to failed nation states. The work is outsourced to young men
and women in exploitative sweatshop conditions.
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The second structural adjustment policy is spending cuts in the basic social services.
Social services that would be considered basic may incorporate: education, health care, and
security. A weakened economy results in spending cuts and service cuts. Compounding the loss
of public sector jobs, failed nation states reduces funding to social services programs. When
weak governments fail to provide fundamental social services, predatory crime groups assume
the social obligation. Assuming the duty of providing social services promotes the influence of
the predatory crime group. When the government is weakened by bad political decisions and
corrupted officials, the health and growth of the country is jeopardized.
Large public sector layoffs are the third structural adjustment policy. This policy marks a
shift in philosophy where failing nation states are to spend less and export more. In an effort to
reduce expenditures government officials cut public sector jobs in large scale numbers.
Capitalistic influences encourage privatization of various services and the contract is given to
predatory crime groups. There is a series of privatizing state owned functions: security,
electricity, telephone, and water. As prices increase on basic needs wages are reduced and jobs
are cut across the board.
Lower wages and labor suppression is the fourth structural adjustment policy. The
implications of this policy on failed nations have resulted in cheap labor which is a financial
incentive for predatory crime groups. The policy is encouraged by international banks, allowing
for the decrease of wages. The lowering of wages is intended to draw foreign investment and to
lower consumer demand. In addition, the formation of public sector unions is discouraged. The
cuts in spending on labor do not transfer over to the military where it using holds top priority
while wage earners are devalued.
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The fifth and sixth laws of the structural adjustment policies consist of devaluation of
local currencies and abolition of price controls on basic food. The devaluation of currencies
effect the labor force, production chain, and is an indicator of a weaken union. Devaluations
have the effect of making a nation’s exports low in cost and imports increase in cost. The poor
populations with in that nation suffer because the costs of goods rise but wages stop growing or
decrease. Coincidentally, price controls are also enforced. Historically, poor country
governments subsidize the price of products like bread and rice. The removal of these subsidizes
has resulted in malnutrition and health risks. The absence of subsidizes has also lead to violent
movements with in poor nations. It is in this environment that predatory organized crime
networks prosper.
The prosperity of predatory crime groups will result in inter-connected networks of
terrorist, mafia, and gangs throughout the world. This spread of organized crime will undermine
the legitimacy of weak nation-states and cause financial and military burdens on wealthy states.
For many failed nation-states an assortment of, crime, social-political change, violence, and
societal problems occur in unhealthy numbers and structures causing concentrated issues for
governing systems in neighboring countries throughout the region (Anderson & Gunnarson,
2003; Shaw, 2003; Cole, 2006; Hamm, 2007; Phillips, 2007). Structured crime groups
prominently subsist behind transnational criminalities whose primary objective is capitalistic in
nature (Newman, 1999; Abadinsky, 2006; Lunde, 2006). The expansion of such crimes will
result in massive population shifts and new governing complications in politically sensitive
regions of the world. Major international leaders from America, China, Europe, and Japan will
need to place this issue of predatory organized crime on their summit agenda. The growth of
predatory crime comes at the expense of economic grow, security and stability around the world.
106

Limitations
SEM
The structural equation is a confirmatory approach used in this study has limitations.
SEM is limited in its use to explore possible relationships when there are more than a handful of
variables. SEM is not causal and this limitation refrain our study from locating indicators that
cause predatory crime formation. SEM is considered to be strictly correlational. The most
impactful limitation is the sample size. The sample size needs to be large enough to get stable
estimates of covariances and correlations. In this study we were limited to the number of nation
states who have failed.

Regression
One of the major limitations in using regression is the requirement to satisfy various
assumptions. An assumption that is included in multiple regression is that the predictor variables
must be uncorrelated with each other. This assumption is also called multi-collinearity. The
number of observations must exceed the number of predictor variables. Green (1991) suggested
specific minimum ratios of observations to predictors; however, sometimes meeting this
assumption is difficult. Predatory organized crime is often correlated in meaning to various
other failed states indicators. This causes for variables to be omitted due to their accepted
meaning. Also, the meaning of predatory organized is still evolving with the growth of global
technology and therefore this may restrict the choice of variables. The following assumptions
are discussed: sample size, multi-collinearity, outliers, and normality.
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Sample Size
Generalizability was a concern during this study because only 133 nations were used to
analyze 46 variables in the SEM model. The sample size needed to be large enough to obtain
results that could generalize or be repeated with other samples. If this objective was not met then
this study would produce very little scientific value. Scholars vary on acceptable guidelines
concerning the number of cases required for multiple regression. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001)
suggested a formula for calculating sample size requirements, taking into account the number of
independent variables that will be utilized: N > 50 + 8m. This study consisted of 6 independent
variables. In the equation m equals the number of independent variables. Therefore, N > 50 +
8(6) = 98, at least 90 samples is necessary in order to produce a result that is generalizable to
other samples. As mentioned earlier, the study consists of 133 nations and nations are the unit of
analysis, so it is a good size for the regression statistical methodology.

Multi-collinearity
Multi-collinearity occurs when the independent variables are highly correlated with an r
of .9 or higher. Singularity exists when one independent variable is actually a combination of
another independent variable. Multiple regression does not accept singularity nor multicollinearity because it does not produce an acceptable regression model.

Outliers
Scores that are too high or very small creates a disturbance in the multiple regression
statistical technique. Multiple regression is fairly sensitive to outliers and this is an apparent
limitation due to the nature of the data used in this study. There are very poor nations who stats
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fall far below the mean of the over 200 failed states. In theory, the extreme poor will have the
extreme scores and the extreme scores would have to be eliminated from the data set. In this
study, extreme scores was deleted from the data set and the scores represent failed nations who
could of contributed to the evaluation of predatory organized crime. However, outliers that
provided quality scores in other attributes remained in the study.

Normality
The concept of normality refers to the distribution of scores and the pattern of the
underlying relationship between the variables. Identifying and reviewing the residuals can assist
in testing this assumption. Residuals are the differences between the obtained and predicted
dependent variable scores. Normality residuals are expected to be normally distributed about the
predicted dependent variable. The linearity residuals have a straight-line relationship with
predicted dependent variable scores. In terms of homoscedasticity, the variance of the residuals
about predicted dependent variable scores should be the same for all predicted scores. This
requirement is a limitation because the levels of failed states are not always related in structure or
pattern and therefore may not produce a normal distribution.

Survey data
This study used a compilation of international survey data and the problem inherent in the
survey data has posed limitations. The survey population is a crucial concept in empirical
research as it determines the set of entities from which the sample can be drawn and affects both
the internal and external validity of a study’s results. Internal validity refers to the extent to
which the manipulation of an independent variable is the sole cause of change in a dependent
variable. In contrast, external validity concerns the generalizability of the results.
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Internal validity is threatened if the observed results are influenced by the confounding
effects of extraneous variables. To control for possible extraneous variation, it is important to
select a homogenous population.
Any research project is also dependent on access to sufficient data to address the research
question(s) of interest. In an international research context, data access concerns not only
securing an appropriate sample, but also ensuring that all data can be feasibly collected given the
additional cost that are involved in cross-border mail, telephone and fax correspondence.
A rather vexing problem in cross-national research is the issue of response style
differences across countries. Studies of attitudes across countries have generally relied on a
comparison of aggregated mean scores to Likert-scale questions. This presupposes that when
people complete a questionnaire, their answers are only based on the substantive meaning of the
items to which they respond (Baumgartner and Steenkamp, 2001). However, people’s responses
are also influenced by their response style. ‘Response style’ refers to a respondent’s tendency to
respond systematically to questionnaire items regardless of their content (Baumgartner and
Steenkamp, 2001).

Directions and Future Research
The research of predatory crime is just as much of the research of impoverished people
and nations. Although the findings in this study could not definitively point to economic failure
as an indicator of predatory crime the results did point to potential solutions influenced by
economic factors. On this note, further research should consider debt cancelation of failed states
burdened with structural adjustment policies. Also, there is a demand for future research in the
areas of neo-liberalism and the post-world war II generation of failing nation-states in relation to
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predatory organized crime. Social justice and research groups have engaged in this policy
initiative of debt relief for failing nation-states. The removal of debt will free failed states to
address their social, political, and economic concerns with a clean slate without the reliance on
organized crime networks.
Various international banking systems (IMF, World Bank) and wealthy countries
maintain the rights to the loan agreement with failing nation-states. It is in the control of these
leading institutions and countries to continue or stop the debt balloon that is currently creating
failing economic conditions. Debt relief has the potential to establish a financially sophisticated
effort to state and economic growth. More funding directed towards improved and adequate
government institutions can potentially lead to effective social services for citizens of failed
nation states. A healthy economy and political system can act as a buffer to predatory organized
crime and the corruption it brings.
Research should seek viable strategies to definitively canceling burdensome global debt,
in nations with high levels of human need and high levels of environmental distress that limits
their ability to meet basic needs of their lower class. The burden of debt disables the failed
state’s ability to achieve a level of sustainable development that ensures a livable quality of life.
Attention is given to other political, environment, and social areas that suffer from debt
burdened weak nation-states; however, predatory crime is equally as important. For example
research has identified exploitation of nature resources such as forest trees by transnational crime
networks. Deforestation is considered an area of concern. Resources such as trees have suffered
from the effects of a failing economy and eventually a failed state. Deforestation is a major
contributor to global warming and is directly linked to failed economies. A country’s debt
burden is strongly correlated with tropical forest destruction.
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Cocaine flood markets in wealthy nations because the production of the cocaine provides
sustaining income to predatory crime groups in failing nations. On another note, jobs have been
lost to wealthy economies with various industries by the thousands. Farms have failed because
the debtor countries can no longer purchase imports from wealthy nations and must send their
funds to international banks. Other leading areas affected by overwhelming debt are
immigration and war. Both are indicators of global instability and are correlated with weak
economies.
Future research should also investigate the responsibility by both lenders and borrowers,
and action to recover resources that were diverted to corrupt regimes, institutions, and
individuals. It may conclude that the very debt help produce the network of criminal leaders that
terrorize the poor regions of the world. Wealthy nations can work together, and with their
counterparts in failing economic regions of the world, to force governments and international
agencies to end the vacuum created by debt burdened economies. It is believed that future
research will point to the need for failing poor nations to be placed at the top of the international
political agenda.
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